Showing posts with label conflict in africa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conflict in africa. Show all posts

3.2.08

Quiet and loud cries from Kigali, Bukavu and Ndjamena

Bullets, blood, violence, death, trouble in the presidential palace. The picture of Westerners (mainly French) fleeing, a YouTube video of policemen and military protecting and patrolling hotels in the capital just one click away. Is this familiar to anyone?

Perhaps not the video on YouTube it isn't, but there are no doubts that the 800.000 nightmare in Rwanda in 1994 still lives in the minds of many and it came to mind once again. It sure lives in my darker imaginary as do the less famous protracted killings that spun off into the neighboring Kivus in the DRC in the following decade, claiming more than 5 million lives since 1998. This time it is not Kigali or Bukavu but Ndjamena.

Chadian Rebels (United Front for Change) heard whispers of an imminent EU force coming to Chad and organized an urgent attack of the capital. In the political drawing boards of the EU, those driving the Common Foreign and Security Policy had assured a few weeks ago, before all the big trouble, that this time the European troops would be more muscled, have a clearer mandate, more experience, success! This already planned out mission was set to announce the dawn of a new era in international involvement and overcome the ghosts of an actor which has been again and again regarded as weak, fractured and useless when it comes to the hard-knock matters of sensitive foreign policy and realpolitik.

The European Union (EU) decided it was too much for her to handle and has now postponed indefinitely its mission. I understand the strategic and realistic claims but cannot help but notice the sad paradox: EU organizes force to contain conflict and protect Darfur refugees from violence in Chad . EU cancels force because of too much conflict and danger in Chad.

This is just after the new constitutional treaty, set to become another unquestionable victory for EU unity (after due ratification), has set in place a structurally dangerous set of rules for the decision of mandates and strategy procedural revisions of future military interventions. Decisions and changes in strategy are to be decided only by those member states who participate directly with troops. A measure which can potentially, once again, create serious situations of dissent within the Union. I hope not.

At the end of the day the AU has the big responsibility of stepping in and make its diplomatic, and if need be, military weight felt. The declaration at the AU meeting that African leaders will not recognize the rebels if they take power leaves an agonizing uncertainty for the future.


19.4.07

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi and Foday Saybana Sankoh - A comparative study




INDEX

INTRODUCTION
JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI - THE FAILED STATESMAN
Savimbi’s enduring facet: balancing the hunter with the blacksmith king
The black cockerel’s shift from nationalism to warlordism
FODAY SAYBANA SANKOH - THE LUMPEN REVOLUTIONARY
Populism without people – the story of Sankoh’s civil war
Sankoh’s children – the “meritocracy of atrocity”
SANKOH VS SAVIMBI
Between the office and the bush
Two models of warlordism: fluidity of roles and the ‘ethos’ behind the men
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES


Introduction

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past”
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852).
The study of the role of leadership and elites in political life has seen little consensus within its ranks. There are the theories that regard individuals and leaders as units, firmly locked into the overpowering contingencies of the structural environment in which they operate. Marxist and liberal meta-theory read historical events as moments of a wider systemic evolution, which single individuals cannot significantly affect. Alternatively, proponents of individual agency celebrate the potential of a great character in vastly affecting political outcomes. The process of power, punctured with access points, is accessible to be directed and moulded by leaders or influential individuals. The latter understanding of the role of leaders underpins this study that will simultaneously account for the systemic environment in which these leaders operated.
Assuming that leadership is taken as significant, particularly in the African case whereby the individualization of politics (Chabal & Daloz 1999) has been subject to much writing in the field of conflict studies, this comparative exercise focuses on the worlds of two of those big men – Foday Sankoh and Jonas Savimbi. In the case of Sankoh his life as the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) leader with a rise and demise will be narrated and analysed while in Savimbi’s case, I will be focusing on contrasting his late period as a warlord with the bulk of the life that he lead as a rebel. The models that the two warlords put into practice will then be compared through their similarities and differences, concluding with a constant re-conceptualizing and contextualising of warlordism as an activity that should be pursued in order to smoothly engage with the changing nature of the actors taking part in conflict.




Jonas Malheiro Savimbi - the failed statesman

‘If you are a drowning man in a crocodile-filled river and you’ve just gone under the third time, you don’t question who is pulling you to the bank until you’re safely on it’

Jonas Savimbi, 14 November 1975 (Bridgland 1986:137)

Savimbi’s enduring facet: balancing the hunter with the blacksmith king

Understanding Savimbi as a sub-product of the Cold War and of the post-Cold War era falls short in offering the entire picture of whom the “doctor from Munhango” exactly was and why he did what he did. Born in 1934, close to the central Angolan plateau, Savimbi was brought up by a father with anxious expectation for his son to move upward in the circle of life. A hardworking, dancing and football-loving young man, the son of Luth Savimbi was able to breakthrough the stringent educational boundaries given to blacks under Portuguese colonial rule. Young Jonas completed his basic studies at an American Protestant Missionary school and eventually found his way to Lausanne, Switzerland to fulfil his life-long dream. He pursued this after leaving his studies in medicine, to finally complete a degree in law and International Politics instead. By then, young Savimbi was already deeply involved in the anti-colonial struggle and had developed an impressive array of influential contacts ranging from African Nationalists, to Cold War brokers (both on the American and Soviet side), to Chinese Maoists. The latter’s methods and training camps extremely influenced Savimbi’s views on how to wage guerrilla warfare and the politico-military strategy of his UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), both in its early times and every time conventional war failed and they returned to the bush..
Savimbi initially saw, on the land-based peasant revolution a closer reflection of his own views of Angolan nationalism than in the ideas of western liberalism or Marxism-Leninism. Despite all his travelling Savimbi perceived himself, above all, as a man of his land. He spoke seven different languages but in none of them was he more rhetorically articulate than in the traditional form of Umbundu, the language of the Ovimbundu – his ethnic group and the largest in Angola constituting around 35 % of the population (EON 2007). His close intimacy with the practice of witchcraft is also well-documented in Linda Heywood’s exploration of ideology in Africa. The bizarre occasions where Savimbi consented to live burials and witch burning, opens the doors to a realm of politics that accompanied him until his last days. It is essential and necessary therefore to understand this outside the rational of classic western political science models. Savimbi’s actions, both pre and post-Cold War times, have to be understood in the context of an environment whereby, among many followers, he was regarded as having a supernatural status believed to even “fly and perform other feats” (Heywood 1998:164). This demonstrates some of the levels of perception about his intimacy with the traditional pre-colonial forces of his homeland. Savimbi built a reputation around him and so managed a balance between the hunter king (autocratic rule) and the blacksmith king (provider, consensus-generating rule) (Heywood 1998: 152). This reliance on ancestral forces and political traditions go a long way to explain the duress of political support from the core Ovimbundo constituencies and his unexpected survival through successive political crises. Although most of the events surrounding Savimbi’s and UNITA’s endurance have focused on external geo-strategic explanations in a first phase (such as South African and American support during the late seventies) and on the modern literature warlord political economy after 1992, the dynamics of the strongly knitted cohesion of his peers still played throughout this period as an important role. Understanding this relationship, between the leader and his constituency, avoids decontextualised “demonisation” of individuals (Cramer open democracy) when understanding conflict in Africa.

The black cockerel’s shift from nationalism to warlordism

Savimbi who was once heralded as a peacemaker, benign negotiator and consensus-bringing broker during the process of independence, went through dramatic personal transformations. His son’s death in 1975 coincided with his greatest moment of popularity as he toured Luanda and called for fair elections to be held. His participation in the provisional government and his first-hand experience of witnessing the early violent FNLA and MPLA scuffles in the Luandan Musseques were the events Savimbi critically pointed to when he dissociated himself from the government. The stage was set for the Angolan arena of the Cold War. Savimbi was to remain a Cold War warrior until 1992 supported by American and South African drive against Soviet Communism and in the case of South Africa avenge Luanda’s support of SWAPO in Namibia. Although his attitude of a government-seeking rhetoric did not change much, his financing did suddenly shift from American and South African geopolitical support to having greater reliance on the diamond and ivory trade (Le Billon 2001). From being connected to the state-based international geopolitical struggle of the Cold War, Savimbi began instead to rely solely upon the stateless international political economy of illicit trade to fight an MPLA that was now recognized as a legitimate government by the Americans. Savimbi’s last grasps at legitimacy on an international level were doomed. A legitimacy that Savimbi still genuinely kept at the level of his local constituency, “possibly developed only for opportunistic reasons but nonetheless real” (Giustozzi 2005: 7). Encompassed in his support constituency his followers had diverse demographic characteristics, ranging from child soldiers (particularly on the latter phases of Savimbi as an insurgent with over 2000 kids) to adults (PANGAE 1997).
The ending of the Cold War brought expectations for a favourable climate towards peace. This was yet again a notion flawed by its over-reliance on a geopolitical analysis of the situation in Angola. In 1994 it was thought by both sides that an end to the conflict would always be political and never military (Simpson, Chris A. report 1994). This was drastically proven wrong eight years later. MPLA virtually won the war, set the terms of peace and has been centrally governing Angola since.
Closely observing the nuances of the narrative of Savimbi’s relationship with his support-base avoids the recurrent fallacy of considering war and violence as irrational. This was the case even after 1992 when Savimbi gave up de facto ambitions for assuming office in Luanda and became a full-time manager of his wealthy Ovimbundo lands fighting the MPLA troops. Zollman and DE Decker were two of the companies that helped Savimbi take what was since the 1970s a traditional low-budget exploration of Angola’s natural riches and make it into a profitable industry. Exploration, particularly in the Cuango valley was centralized and very profitable In late 1997 as MPLA gained terrain Savimbi began decentralising his industry and focused on the northern regions of Angola sometimes even stretching all the way into southern Congo (Dietrich 2000: 5). Sets of sanctions that started in 1998 started making Savimbi’s profits more difficult but did not prevent UNITA from having sales reports of up to $800 000 in 1999 (Dietrich 2000: 16). UNITA’s weapons came mainly from supplies from the independence days, Cold War sponsors and appropriations from the MPLA. The US provided approximately $250 million in covert weapons shipments to Jonas Savimbi between 1986 and 1991, supplying weapons such as 106 mm recoilless rifles that were then mounted on four-wheel-drive vehicles for greater effectiveness (Hartung 1995). After 1992 most of the supplies came from the international black market Savimbi was so well connected to in his non-sanctioned diamond dealings.
Fifteen bullets engraved in the head of Savimbi in 2002 brought the war in Angola to an end. It ended as so few do nowadays, with a clear Clausewitzian victor: in this case MPLA beating Savimbi. Post-Savimbi Angola is now a wounded country with both great potential as well as many contradictions. Looking back at the conflict, fact remains that, if always dramatic and regrettable, violence is rarely irrational and never unfounded. Savimbi should therefore be understood rather as under the umbrella of a more nuanced notion of warlordism. Taking Giustozzi’s typology of contemporary military political actors, Savimbi can be seen on an initial phase as a hybrid of the nationalistic non-clan based political entrepreneur (someone who seizes control of political groups or ideologies to mobilise support) and of the traditional local ruler (a leader who mobilizes support from within their own clan or tribe) who thereafter began practising de-facto warlordism after the Cold War and then governing the state became a practical impossibility after losing the 1992 legislative elections (Giustozzi 2005 12).


Foday Saybana Sankoh - The lumpen revolutionary

“I don’t trust anybody except God, but I am prepared to negotiate with the devil if only that will bring peace to the people of Sierra Leone”

Foday Sankoh (Godwin 2003: 37)

Populism without people – the story of Sankoh’s civil war

Sankoh’s initial one hundred men constituted of a “populist movement without popular support” (Richards 2005:120). Their brutal tactics and their military and social success in recruiting revolutionaries, indoctrinating and profanely empowering them engrossed Sankoh’s ranks and made them a force to be reckoned with. The conflict saw some fifteen thousand civilians murdered and many of them internally displaced during the five years of the war (Richards 1996: 19). Sadly, witnessing the RUF’s military success, the government’s RSLMF (Revolutionary Sierra Leone Military Forces) and to some extent the Kamajor militias too, started copying the recruitment and fear-instilling methods of the RUF and the cycle of violence simply cemented itself on both sides as the natural modus operandi (Richard & Peters 1998: 184). Early in 1995 the most famous meddling of a Private Military Company in conflict occurred. Executive Outcomes effectively won the war for the government, billing the Sierra Leonean state $35 million but, together with the Kamajor militias, secured key diamond fields and pushed Sankoh to opt for the option of negotiations and elections in 1996. This was notably something that $260 million from the UN mission was unable to do (Schulhofer-Wohl 2000). A common culture of violence saw a bizarre unholy alliance between the RUF and the lower ranks of the national army (AFRC) assuming power over Freetown in 1997. The regime led by Paul Koroma had Foday Sankoh as number two and brought together “two different groups of alienated youth in arms” (Abdullah 1998: 230-234). John Paul Koroma’s AFRC and Foday Sankoh together took power over Freetown temporarily until Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops drove them out of the capital and put Kabbalah back in power. When Sankoh was arrested from 1997 to 1999 and eventually sentenced to death in Nigeria, his “siblings” in the RUF led by Sam Brockarie took over Freetown in an act that was more of an enraged and passionate cry of anger than a carefully thought through strategic operation. They kept together and oriented themselves even without the physical presence of their leader. RUF members were tightly knit together in savage meritocratic and egalitarian ways of relating to one another (Boas 2004) in a manner that sometimes resembled the twisted group rationality shown in the film “Lord of the flies”. Conflict continued until the Lome Peace Accords of 1999 remarkably saw Sankoh as the proposed head of a commission responsible for marketing the country's diamonds. Sankoh’s promise to have RUF disarmed never happened, thus the war and diamond looting resumed and Sankoh even took some five hundred UN peacekeepers hostage.
It was not until Britain sent an aggressive and well-equipped force to intervene that the RUF was defeated. In 2000 Sankoh was captured by an infuriated mob and handed over to the British. It was an ignoble capture of a man that forced and brainwashed his followers in a manner that they loved him through fear, rhetorical vigour and the superstition that he had semi-divine powers - believing he could vanish and was also immune to bullets (Economist 2003). With Sankoh’s second imprisonment peace finally came to Sierra. In custody his usual twisted eloquence disappeared and he apparently began to lose his mind until 2003 saw the quiet death of Foday Sankoh while awaiting his trial.

Sankoh’s children – the “meritocracy of atrocity”

Sankoh grew up setting traps and wrestling friends in the jungles of Sierra Leone. He was an ex-corporeal of the British army in Sierra Leone and of the failed United Nations mission in the Congo during the early 1960s. He was a photographer and cameraman, trained in Scotland, and jailed for seven years in 1971 for expressing his discontent towards the corrupt ruling elites of Joseph Saidu Momoh (Richards 1996: 18). After his release, Green Book training in Ghaddaffi’s Libya followed and a temporary detour to help his good friend, Charles Taylor in Liberia, preceded the formation of his RUF. Charles Taylor was instrumental in aiding Sankoh with strategic and military support especially in terms of supplying weapons and helping out with diamond smuggling. The RUF’s chaotic and dispersed promenading in and around Freetown was backboned by a firm grip on strategic alluvial diamond mining sites in the eastern part of the country. Foday Sankoh was, like Savimbi, a man of the bush and of great charisma, mysticism and adaptability. Unlike Savimbi, he was the instead a leader of a sect not an army commander (Richards 1999). A sect under the motto: “No More Slaves, No More Masters. Power and Wealth to the People" (RUF 1995). Although a man of the bush himself, his structure of communication meant that he rarely stepped out of his well-protected command centre, the Zagoda, and that he was frequently a “disembodied radio presence but a persistent” (Richards 2005: 130), attentive and inspiring one. After effectively purging his organization of Kanu and Masaray in 1992, two co-founders of the organization and the only real potential competitors threatening his leadership, Sankoh found himself organizationally-wise with all the time and room to indulge in revolution and in nurturing his “children”.
The presence of Ghaddaffi’s famous Green Book in the Conflict of Sierra Leone is a controversial one. Authors such as Abdullah (1998:213) see it as a background cacophony of propaganda to what was actually a social environment characterized by violence inherent to the characteristics of the “lumpen proletariat” – a disembodied and dehumanized youth. The book was taken light-heartedly and awfully manipulated to suit the circumstances. Richards (2005) on the other hand gives great precedence to the impact of the book, particularly on the leading cadre with their training in Libya. Richards assigns Sankoh’s young RUF rebels as ideologically sound individuals with, if not well carved motivations for their actions, well founded reasons or motives for behaving the way they do – at least strategically and circumstantially. Sankoh was the head of a hydra-like organization to which he attended and cared for in his fatherly fashion. His collectivist leadership meant that comrades-in-arms became a substitute to the family, whose murdering was frequently a pre-requisite for adhering to the movement, and village family structures where youths were usually violently ripped away from (Richards and peters). Although the influence of the Green Book and the actual force of ideology in the ranks of Sankoh’s RUF is avidly discussed, the fact remains that both authors have a point. Richards is right in pinpointing that there was a twisted rational about the actions of the RUF’s youth; and Abdullah’s parsimonious “lumpen proletariat” conveys the telling idea that many of them were caught within a systemic rollercoaster of violence. Both of these studies put together a grim picture where the meritocracy of atrocity became the modus operandi of everyday life.

Sankoh vs Savimbi

“The first resource that is squandered in a revolution is rationality and the last thing that returns is rationality. If it ever returns.”

Abdolkarim Soroush, On Reason (http://www.drsoroush.com/English/By_DrSoroush/On_reason.html )

Between the office and the bush

Assuming that there are two kinds of rebels in Africa - insurgents and warlords (Breytenbach 2003: 6), if the claims in the voices of Sankoh and Savimbi are taken at face-value they are to be considered insurgents since political control was always a central feature of their rhetoric discourse. Further scrutiny of their behaviour however shows that the last years of Savimbi saw him steadily lean back on his selected Angolan territories for diamond and ivory plundering. After support waned from both the United States and South Africa, UNITA no longer had any significant allies. Thus the fragile welfare structures that had been put in place in UNITA-controlled territory quickly started to fade. Savimbi’s transformation into a full-blown warlord was then complete. In taking a deeper look into Sankoh’s actions it shows that he was more comfortable in the bush fighting and plundering than he ever was in his brief passage through government in 1997. Sankoh fits well in Giustozzi’s more nuanced conceptualization of contemporary military-political actors – because he was the non-clan based military-political entrepreneur by excellence. Green Book ideology rhetorically adapted to the generational “powder keg” in Sierra Leone mixed together with a meritocratic egalitarian system designed by Sankoh. This mobilised support and resources with a mix of fear and revolutionary bravado. It was the youth that had been disembodied from their families and villages that followed Foday Sankoh. An understanding of Sankoh’s RUF as a “lumpen insurgency” sheds more light on Sankoh’s specific mode of organization than just applying to it a label of an illegitimate warlord.
Accepting the definition of a warlord as one who “acts financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which he is based” (Duffield 1997) one can argue that this “character” in contemporary conflict studies retains characteristics from politicians, soldiers and businesspersons. As non-office seeking politicians, they attempt to retain their power by carefully “juggling” their rhetoric and their relations with important political actors of the environment in which they operate. This is evident in Sankoh, accusing the Kamajors of having started with the real atrocities, or Savimbi’s rhetoric against MPLA even after the elections. As soldiers they primarily care about the survival of their organization, and their own – the strategy of war is always on top of their agenda. Additionally as warlords, this dimension is usually their identifying facet. This is the case for both Sankoh and Savimbi. What they do not have as office-seeking politicians, as warlords it makes up with a connection to the illegal economy. Through illicit business they finance and feed their war machines and cast a web of business relations in the profitable parallel markets such as diamond, ivory, drugs and human trafficking. Savimbi and Sankoh were cases in hand of these three roles coming together in the same persona. The three facets became more salient at different times in their lives. Sankoh was more of a politician when he spoke about giving free education and health initially in his operations. Savimbi became increasingly a businessman when he lost American support and came to rely even more on diamond, ivory and hardwood trade as a financial resource. Similarly despite the traditional label of Sankoh as a warlord, on the initial and final periods of the conflict where he practiced populism without popular support, one can see him as a conflict entrepreneur. This concept is consequently more suited to his persona as he was “more a sort of manipulator who had limited autonomous power and therefore tended to fade away more easily” (Giustozzi 2005:17). This contrasts to the localized yet reliable support-base that Savimbi managed to maintain even after the 1992 elections and his warlord policies.
The Sierra Leonean state was always a quasi-state. There was never a situation whereby the state established one overarching network of power, this was a fact that Sankoh cleverly exploited in the early stages with his anti-patronage rhetoric. With 75 % of the budget given to the army at a bad time with a collapsing economy, that was fast becoming dependant on taxes from foreign trade, the Sierra Leonean government in 1995 was the reflection of a weak governance with a history of patronage and was taking its toll (Reno 1998: 115). The case of Angola was slightly different. MPLA set up a strongly centralized system in the areas that it operated and Angola was firmly divided into the MPLA state and its army (financed mainly by oil revenues) and into Savimbi’s UNITA financed by its strategic regions of diamond and ivory rich areas. There were therefore two dimensions to the Angolan state after the 1992 elections. On the one hand the network of influence allowed the MPLA to try very hard to centralize its power and was to a great degree successful, on the other hand its influence outside Luanda was sometimes limited and its de facto governance of the territory was never quite a reality (today the Cabinda enclave question remains for example unresolved).

Two models of warlordism: fluidity of roles and the ‘ethos’ behind the men

In conflict situations there are indeed “many answers to the question of “who benefits” (Breytenbach 2003: 9). However I feel it is safe to say that in this case few actors in the war benefited from the conflict in absolute terms, except perhaps for the enriched coffers of Executive Outcomes and Sandline that participated on the side of the Sierra Leonean government and the Ukrainian PMC contracted by Sankoh. Also, at times, the elites did benefit: Sankoh with his entourage and Savimbi with the top cadres of UNITA. It was more often the case than not that actors partaking in the conflict benefited in absolute terms. Rather, they benefited in relative terms. In the case of the RUF in particular the meritocratic system gave youngsters that participated in the cause, the possibility of ascending the social ladder rapidly through the use of violence – this illusory sense of power permeates the ambiguity and the layers of attempting to answer the question: who benefits? The case of warlord Savimbi fighting against MPLA and his defeat meant that those on the side of the MPLA did benefit from the war ultimately, in relative terms that is, vis-à-vis the old entourage Savimbi left behind after his death. Of course in absolute terms however, despite the opportunity that dos Santos cleverly seized to hold onto power and centralize revenues and mechanisms, very few people in Angola benefited from the war.
The main difference between the two warlord “ethos” can summarily be understood if one looks at the nature of their child-soldiering. In both cases the use of child soldiers is a dramatic and terrible act. However in the case of Sankoh, child soldiers and their characteristics defined the essence of RUF’s relations which was in fact a sect underpinned by a generational revolt. Savimbi’s use of child soldiers on the other hand was more utilitarian and circumstantial. Both MPLA and UNITA made use of child soldiers but these did not define the essence of the relations between the members of the organization per se.
Reno’s breakdown of the processes of conflict in Africa that Breytenbach conceptualizes into the triangle of conflict, leading to the tripartite divide between rulers, rebels and mercantilists, is an interesting framework for the analysis of the two leaders. Notably Foday Sankoh was at different times and to a different extent both a rebel and a ruler simultaneously (number two in Paulo Koroma’s 1997 office). Savimbi was also momentarily part-ruler in the period of transition to independence. A clearer example is however the one of Charles Taylor. He was a rebel and a mercantilist (when he manpowered RUF ranks for the 1991 offensive) at different times. My point is how these three categories should be understood as fluid, interchangeable and overlapping and also how they should not aim at “boxing” leaders of factions into cemented roles. To understand who Savimbi was as a warlord, is essential to first understand how he became one when initially stemming from as an insurgent and why thus why he changed his modus operandi. Just like the Chinese warlords of the early 20th century, Savimbi’s and Sankoh’s actions should be seen for the most part, as “reactive” ones (Mackinlay 2000: 126).

Conclusion

This synopsis of Savimbi and Sankoh’s lives, of the interaction of these men with their surroundings and of their sets of responses to both internal and external changes in their political environment, concludes overall about one-dimensional approaches. It does so either by focusing just on their geo-political positioning or on the empirical violent output of their actions. Both of these are insufficient to paint a comprehensive picture of their actions.
A comparative historical approach is necessary in particular, when understanding Savimbi as a warlord, since he changed from an insurgent to a warlord but retained important characteristics of his years as a rebel. Sankoh’s horror story from beginning to end when observed from the perspective of a young Sierra Leonean, whose life was turned upside down as he was tossed into the violent world of the RUF, turns out to be even more tragic. As one immerses yourself under the ethos and the rationality of Sankoh and the RUF one becomes aware just how unnecessary and avoidable it was. The roles of Savimbi’s and Sankoh’s leadership cannot be underestimated. Savimbi was the glue that held his organization together and Sankoh the storyteller and hero that mischievously “liberated” all those following him, either willingly or not. Behind closed bunkers and bush refuges, both men, at the peak of their rule as warlords, broke dozens of deals with illicit traders and established comprehensive business networks. This was their way to reach out into the developed world and successfully feed their war machine as well as their private coffers, while resisting sanctions, UN interventions and lack of internal support.
A great part of their lives remains shrewd in mystery but the practical consequences of their actions in the form of atrocities, conflict and destruction were and still remain very much a reality. Both Sankoh’s and Savimbi deaths have now given their birthplaces a unique window of opportunity to enjoy peace and focus on development and constructive politics. Their stories and their lives, though tragic, should not be left in dark archives of death toll statistics or be limited to Hollywood blockbusters. This because the study and reflection about the lives and desires of leaders like Savimbi and Sankoh is crucial. Moreover contextualizing should offer no excuse for the violent actions they carried out but it can nonetheless allow for us to better understand it more clearly. Clarifying this will hopefully in the future be used to better tackle and handle individuals showing similar behaviour and threatening a re-occurrence of such tragedies.

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RUF 1995 “RUF’s manifest - Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone” Sierra Leone web http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html (16 April 2007)
Schulhofer-Wohl 2000 “Should we privatize the Peacekeeping?” Washington Post May 12 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/private.htm (16 April 2007)
Peters, K. and Richards, P. 1998. ‘Why we fight’: Voices of youth combatants in Sierra Leone. Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 68, No. 2. 183-210

15.3.07

The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea-Bissau: a comparison


Introduction

At a first glance, Kinshasa and Bissau are many miles apart. Each city stands as the formal capital of two different geographical extensions in the African continent. The sub-regions to which they belong are noticeably different in their setting and their dynamics with the geographical centrality of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) putting it a “small step away” from most African sub-regions. This is an important geopolitical characteristic to take into account in order to understand how, at one point in time, there were eight countries directly involved on different sides of the conflict (Lemarchand 2000: 324). Guinea-Bissau on the other hand is a almost a micro-state, with 1.5 million people and located on one of the edges of the unstable West Africa Region, bordering Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. Perhaps the single most important material difference in distinguishing how the conflicts unfolded is the distinct protractor material agents of each case. The resources funding the factions in the two conflicts were, respectively, diamonds, coltan and other minerals in the case of DRC and a handful of cashew nuts, possible privileges of holding office in Bissau and foreign assistance from Senegal and Portugal in the case of Guinea-Bissau.
In order to dig deeper into the conflicts though, the different time spans and intensities of the conflict will be initially accounted for, followed by an understanding of the distinct political economies of the two conflicts and a look at the characteristics of the actors involved in the conflicts. Afterwards the discussion moves into an analytical discussion of the nature of the patrimonial networks involved in each case and conclude with a look at the distinct roles of ethnicity in Guinea-Bissau and the DRC.

To put the conflict in Guinea-Bissau into a few words, the struggle consisted of a fallout between two patrons. A fallout between two strongmen (Vieira and Ansumane Mane) that were quick to activate their patronage and diplomatic networks and take part in what was to become a thunder high-intensity war, a civil war. The conflict was fairly short, lasting only 11 months (between January and November 1998) and was mostly concentrated in the areas surrounding the capital. The diplomatic tensions between Senegal and Bissau surrounding the Casamance rebels were at the end used as a “trigger-excuse” for the conflict (UI 2004:15). The separatists, Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) have historical and ethnic ties with Guinea-Bissau. The extensive illegal trade in cannabis and arms between the two regions is of special importance, as this trade was one of the rents the Guinea-Bissau military informally collected to finance itself (Ostheimer 2001). Problems with the military started growing from the middle of the 1990s onwards, mainly as a result of a change of policy towards Senegal. In 1995, the long-standing president João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira claimed that Guinea Bissau was to fight the rebellion in Casamance, threatening this lucrative business, in which not only ordinary soldiers, but also high-ranking army officers, were taking part (Uppsala Conflict Database 2006). Though the causes lie deeper in the patrimonial structures of power, this bilateral illegal trade can be seen as the apparent trigger of the war that started in June 1998, since the responsibility of the supply of arms to the Casamance rebels was inculcated by the president on the chief of armed forces, Ansumane Mané. The latter reacted against this dubious accusation and was able to mobilize vast sections of a chronically underpaid army. Vieira had successfully tried to show that he was opposed to the MFDC, and was therefore supported by Senegal during the war. However, it was later discovered that officials very close to Vieira had been involved in the arms trade with the separatists (Uppsala Conflict Database 2006; UI 2004:15).
Putting the DRC conflict into such a systemic analysis is even harder as the interconnectedness of its events cannot be underestimated. Labelling it a civil war would be falling short of its actual scope and complexity. Lemarchand (2000:327) traces the inherent volatility of the Great Lakes, of which the problematic DRC Kivu regions is a part of, to three factors: lack of coincidence between ethnic and geographical maps; population density; and colonial policies. Also according to Lemarchand, in the DRC, the origins of the conflict can be traced all the way back to the 1962 Rwandan revolution. This was the first spark that ignited the antagonism between the Tutsi and the Hutu tribes followed by flow after flow of hate; distrust; grievance; coups; pogroms; genocides and refugee surges. Conflict has been a daily affair in the area until today. Endless refugee flows made sure that the entire region was covered by a complex web of violent cross-border ethnic strife politics. A case in point is how the rush to the Kivus after the 1994 Rwanda genocide brought “mayhem” to the areas. The resident Tutsi population (then renamed the Banyamulengue) was the first to suffer from the flight of hot blooded Hutus to the Kivus. The response by the Rwandan government in 1996 was sharp and even bloodier, doing “what no one else had the capacity or the will to accomplish” (Lemarchand 2000:335), tragic massacres in Hutu refugee camps in the Kivus followed. The resentment of the rest of the local population, particularly embodied in the Mai Mai militia completed a rough “ethnic picture” of the situation. The follow-up Rwandan and Ugandan incursion, that officially was seeking self-protection, gathered momentum and, by following close behind Laurent Kabila’s ADFL rebellion, was able to topple Mobuto in 1996. When in 1998 Kabila’s intimacy with Kigali and Kampala was costing him his popularity, a 180 degrees shift in attitude towards the Great Lakes neighbours finally set the stage for Africa’s “First World War”. Kabila was supported by Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan, Chad and Namibia while on the other side was the Ugandan and Rwandan backed CRD (later to split into CRD-Goma and CRD-Kisangani) and Burundi. It was amidst this confusion that the economy of plunder settled in, and the rich mineral areas of the Kivus were informally and frequently illegally stripped out of its resources by mercenaries and soldiers of the different factions. The strategy of war in that area slowly seemed to become “hypnotized” by the glitter of alluvial diamonds and gold and the dull blackness of coltan.

The different nature of the two conflicts is also reflected on the distinct characteristics of their direct participants. First of all, the similar personality and background traits of Mobuto, Kabila, Mane and Nino (such as charisma, ruthlessness, ambition and military background) are worth a mention since, as is discussed below, they made them greatly suitable for operating in a systemic political setting characterized by a set of competing patrimonial networks. Besides the previously mentioned armies of the patrons, other aspects and actors should be looked at. In the DRC, the unique economy of war comprised alien national armies such as the Ugandan and the Rwandan ones that contained a commercial branch responsible for strategically exploring DRC’s natural resources whilst the conflict was ongoing. The Zimbabwen/Congolese OSLEG and COSLEG as well as several business carried out by the state-owned Gecamines represented another variant of conflict profiting. Though frequently engaging in high risk projects, these peculiar organizations represented mining consortiums that explored privileged commercial and mineral licenses in Congo (for example by Zimbabwe) in exchange for political and military support during the conflict. (Nabudere 2003:57). Moreover, the role of for example Swedish and Anglo-American Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that had invested great amounts in the region (before and during the conflicts) has to be accounted for since they directly and indirectly intervened in the conflict on the sides of those they had commercial contracts with (Nabudere 2003:41). Unsurprisingly enough the factions and the particularly economy of war of DRC became highly attractive for various Private Military Companies (PMCs) such as Sandline and MPRI (Snow and Barouski 2006:40) who could profitably put their strategic firepower to work on behalf of governments and mining consortiums in a region that was sprinkled with a great number of localized pockets of richness. In terms of warlordism, this phenomenon was not witnessed in Guinea-Bissau, the spoils of war were always limited to power-seeking agents and the geopolitics of the country did not offer any kinds of conditions for post Cold-war Taylor-like or Savimbi-like characters to survive. Both Nino and Ansumane Mane’s factions were office-seeking. In the DRC one can argue that some top officials from the Rwandan and Ugandan armies were acting as warlords, with a de facto economic exploration of the Kivus while political governance was consistently disregarded and office-seeking ambitions were obviously inexistent. There was almost a sort of accomplice state-warlordism in the region with the officials of the two countries being well aware of the situation. Militias in the DRC conflict played a central role as was seen in the actions of Hutu interhamwe militias operating in the Kivus after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the Mayi Mayi militias that had operated with little consistency always in the limits between being militia, rebels and warlords. Militias were not ostensibly used in the conflict in Guinea Bissau except for later in the war, when the conflict was re-ignited by Mane after the peace deal. Mane claimed that Vieira was so desperate as to recur to “recruiting young militia members from the Papel and Bijagos groups” (Ostheimer 2001). Lastly, while the dimension of the child-soldier phenomena was much more extreme in the DRC with recurrent abductions and abuses by a great number of the intervenients such as RCD-Goma, the Congolese government army, the mayi-mayi, the RCD-ML and the armed groups of Ituri. Child soldiers also constituted a central problem in the case of the 1998-1999 war in Guinea-Bissau (Amnesty International 2003; Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers 2004).

New Wars and the economy of coping

Unlike in the case of Guinea-Bissau, when looking at the different causal factors of the conflict in the DRC one of the most engaging aspects is how the conflict seems to fit nicely within recent theories of “new wars” (Kaldor 1999). This new notion is groundbreaking in claiming that the conditions of modernity and the way most conflicts are waged today represent more than just an updated version of old grievances. Indeed, the economy of war in the DRC appears to be the clearest of cases of how the classic concept of warfare is outdated, however, one should still be cautious about carelessly labelling it strictly as a “greed war” (Collier 2000). Tendencies to simply distinguish between political and criminal conflict , for example, can also at times lack an understanding of an important tension present in sub-Saharan Africa that is a blurriness between an economy of criminality and an economy of coping (Jackson 2002). The example of the Kivus in the Democratic Republic of Congo shows how from the moment that a conflict is labelled as criminal, the actions of all actors taking part in the informal economy funding the armed factions are understood as criminal. The overarching label of the conflict as criminal is however unsatisfactory at the individual level since, to use the words of Jackson, the line between individuals dwelling in criminality and those coping with their surrounding system of power is not drawn (Jackson 2005:531).
Still, regardless if you can put aside ethnicity as in Guinea-Bissau or look at grievances as historical as in the DRC for example, one must look at new phenomena including the Diaspora, humanitarian aid, small arms trade and money laundering as just some of the recent developments that have transformed the way wars are waged and sustained. The two conflicts, one a “single showdown” by two very peculiar political characters and the other a protracted affair, are cases in hand of some of the changes in military warfare in regards to how they stretch into different dimensions. Guinea-Bissau because its trigger was rooted in arms smuggling and the “shaddy” patrimonial interests of office-holders in its relations to the outside world and the DRC given its surreal chain of involvement. This chain directly links corrupt army officers supervising a digging site in Bukavu, and the guy in the living room that spends too many hours playing a coltan-equipped playstation2 in Brighton (Snow & Barouski 2006: 39).

Role of external actors in triggering, sustaining and dealing with the conflicts

Both states remain inseparable from their respective regions and from the transnational actors that took part in them. Whilst in the case of DRC one must look at the entire chain of economic processes that goes from a small child soldier/miner in northern Kivu to the diamond trader in Antwerp, the conflict in Guinea-Bissau is better understood if one sticks to a framework of analysis at the national and regional level. According to Galtung (1964:2), peace can be conceived of in two different ways, either as negative or as positive. The former differs from the latter in that negative simply implies an absence of war and violence, whereas positive peace involves a sustained integration of states and peoples. Considering this, the sets of interstate relations both in the Great Lakes Region of which the DRC is a part of and in Bissau’s West Africa constitute an example of negative peace. Factors that could potentially contribute to inter-state conflict, such as artificial boundaries and transnational ethnic groups, are present. However, while the DRC has been tormented by de facto interstate conflict, though not for classic Clausewitzian land-grabbing reasons, there has hardly been any inter-state conflict in West Africa in the post-colonial years. While the power brokers in the Great lakes such as the ancient colonial power (Belgium) and the US have done little more than add fuel to the fire, in West Africa a positive rapprochement between France and Nigeria did occur in the region. Nigeria takes it on itself to be the leading hegemonic power in West Africa and ECOWAS has been an interesting, though very fragile, experiment in regional integration politics. In contrast, the Great Lakes region lies in the “middle of nowhere” in the game of geopolitics. Caught between: impoverished and problematic Congo Brazzaville, Sudan and the Central African Republic; overpopulated and genocidal Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and; for a long time, Savimbi’s rebel north-western Angola. Nowadays, it is in the DRC that the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world is, with over 15000 troops (MONUC). MONUC has been stationed in the country since 2000 and is strategically concentrated on the problematic Kivus regions in the east, having been able to hold the peace together successfully and helping out with the electoral procedures of 2006. While in the DRC, “’the rebellion’ is very largely an externally sponsored insurgency, in which Rwanda and Uganda are the key players” (Lemarchand 2000:325) in Bissau’s civil war Senegal and ECOMOG in particular were key players but remained secondary to the individualized power politics of Mane and Nino.
A common trait between the countries and their relations with the regions they inhabit is that economic cooperation remains very low at the official level while informal international trade and migration thrive in ever closer ties across the borders. These close ties, and above all their informality, contribute to the diffusion of internal conflicts into neighbouring regions and bordering states. Trans-boundary fluxes of refugees, arms, diamonds and mercenaries are consequences of conflict but can also exacerbate underlying tensions. As a result, the fact that the integration is mainly at the informal, instead of at the official level has prevented Western Africa from presenting a set of inter-state relations of positive peace (Kacowics 1997; McGowan 2006:247). The exact same can be said of the DRC.
The ending of the conflicts in 1999 for Bissau and in 2000 for DRC also had a regional dimension to it, with the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries (CPLP) taking the initiative to try and moderate a resolution of the conflict and the UN having a crucial role in the latter. Despite advances mainly through the more recent EU framework for aid, when comparing Guinea-Bissau to the DRC and other countries in the region, it becomes clear that the relation of the international community towards Guinea-Bissau has been low-profile and somewhat limited (Ostheimer 2001). Similarly, the country has received comparatively little attention with academics, something which is not easily justified. Paradoxically, Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on foreign aid which greatly influences the country’s foreign policy (UI 2004:14).

Patrimonial networks

An important similarity between the two countries is how the weakness of the government and state institutions at the macro-political level is closely related to the diffusion of patrimonial structures at the micro-political level. The main function of patrimonial networks is the distribution of political support and loyalty on behalf of the client and the distribution of resources on behalf of the patron through a network of personal relationships (Vigh and Whyte 2003:111). In a situation where the most important economic sector is the informal one, combined with the fragility of the central administration and its disconnection from the larger parts of society, patrimonial structures thrive. When the local constituencies are the main source of resources and legitimacy of the government, they will inevitably influence the actions of the government. However, when the government does not rely on local constituencies for support, it is easier to revert to patrimonialism and factionalism to build a support base.
Within the state, these personal power networks are more influential in de facto distribution of political power than the formal bureaucratic institutions. The consequence is that certain individuals, top-level patrons of patronage networks, and their factions achieve dominant positions in politics based on their ability to gather informal support both in Guinea Bissau (Forrest 2002:239; 249) and in DRC (Vlassenroot&Huggins 2005:131). Both states lack accountability and are dependent on: external financial support in the case of Guinea Bissau; and on revenue from the exploration of mineral resources in the case of DRC. This means that, while in Bissau centripetal forces concentrate power competition in the government since it constitutes the primary locus for financial resources, in the case of the DRC the exploration of mineral resources can very hardly be monopolized by the state.
In patrimonial networks, resources flow from a top-down patriarchal-pyramid of hierarchy, on whom the rest of the networks are dependent. If these persons lose their resource bases or positions of power, large amounts of people are negatively and dramatically affected at once. The result is a situation of perpetuated structural insecurity and unpredictability (Vigh and Whyte 2003:148).

The distinct roles of ethnicity

While religion played a secondary role on both cases and is unhelpful for our comparison, ethnicity instead can be insightful when comparing the two conflicts. The case of Guinea-Bissau represents a truly fascinating object of analysis for the ambiguous role of ethnicity at two levels: firstly in the discourses and empirical daily relations of people and groups in Guinea Bissau; and secondly in the subsequent academic interpretations of its role within social and political processes. While Vigh and Whyte (2003) find ethnicity to be a key underlying factor in explaining patterns of patrimonialism and the mobilization of young militias, others disregard it as unhelpful and as lacking explanatory power for their analysis (Rudebeck 2001). It remains a fact that there has been an outspoken tradition of inter-ethnic unity and cooperation in Guinea-Bissau. Considering this, the conflict remains one of the very few witnessed in Africa that, on a first read, could be fairly well understood without analysing the ethnic composition of the country.
By adopting a circumstantialist approach to ethnicity, instead of a primordialist one (Eriksen 2002:54), we will look at ethnicity as a fluid social construction. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, and despite some religious and ethnic divergences, this appears evident, with multi-allegiance, conversions and shifts in the identities and belongings of different individuals occurring across ethnic lines over time. In the case of Congo these social constructs solidified and played a central role, particularly when it came to the historical ethno-class divide between Hutus and Tutsis. The civil war in Guinea-Bissau arose out of a high level political brawl and the conflict in the DRC out of a complex synergy between hatreds born out of an unequal ethno-class colonial design and competition for resources in an overpopulated era (Tshitereke 2003:86; Homer-Dixon 1995). Indeed, “Rwanda is at the top of the list of all African states in terms of population density, with Burundi and North Kivu close behind” (Lemarchand 2000: 330). In Guinea-Bissau, overpopulation was not a problem and this resulted in the top leaders involved, for one reason or another, not overtly fractionalising the conflict along ethnic lines while in the DRC leaders were overwhelmed by the greater genocidal narrative.
Discontentment in Guinea-Bissau was basically fomented by a revolt of unhappy, unpaid soldiers, and broadly supported by a majority of the population while in the DRC it was about the unfair highly ethnicized structures of political and economic power distribution. One case saw non-ethnicized division, between those “for or against the regime that had ruled the country since independence in 1974” (Rudebeck 2001:29) and the other saw highly ethnicized divisions replicating themselves across the entire region resulting in genocidal turmoil. This can explain why some, such as Rwanda, called for a second Berlin Conference in order to redesign state borders along ethnic lines. (Nabudere 2003:53).

Conclusion

In retrospect the tensions were inherent to the two societies that shared the similar problem of patrimonial politics. These however were practiced in essentially different ways. In the case of Guinea-Bissau they remained “big man” affairs and non-ethnicized charismatic politics and in the case of the DRC, patrimonial politics was also present but it was moulded within cemented ethno-class fractionalization between Hutus and Tutsis. The length, form, nature and modus operandi of the actors interacting in the two conflicts were therefore substantially different.
In a civil war such as in Guinea-Bissau the war objectives of each participant is more or less straightforward (i.e. office-seeking). In the DRC finances were generated even while the conflict was in progress as long as if you were in the right business and aligning with the right side. Both of them saw external intervention but in the case of the DRC this went beyond simple geopolitics and security-seeking, comprising of the added dimensions of historical ethnic hatred and in-conflict-profit maximizing, which deeply complicated the rational of conflict where factions usually seek the quickest victory possible.
The most insightful comparison however remains how in the case of Guinea-Bissau ethnicity never remained overtly institutionalised or stable, but insistently underlying the “constantly changing political configurations” (Vigh and Whyte 2003:44). Both countries are now facing a crucial moment of democratic consolidation, let us just hope that this consolidation does not imply fragility and added grievances over the division of power. That the “price” to wage war becomes, once and for all, unaffordable in economic, political and moral terms.

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