Multilateralism and Middlepowership in South Africa’s foreign policy

How does a multilateralist foreign policy agenda (in theory) help South Africa meet its international objectives?

South Africa since 1994 been a very active and eager player in international relations. This eagerness has at times been misinterpreted or perceived as being in fact an expansionist and aggressive policy now focusing not in the security but in the economic profit. There has been a good degree of continuity in the central pillars and principles of South African foreign policy cutting across Mandela’s and Mbeki’s presidencies (Cornelissen 2006:29).

Multilateralism at the regional and global level can serve to incrementally “gain the support of developing countries” (Cornelissen 2006:33) and advance an alternative agenda for combating poverty and fostering development. In theory, multilateralism can be able to “multiply influence and leverage while minimising exposure and risk on sensitive issues” (Black 2001:77). For example, stabilizing and improving security in African countries by means of a multilateral approach (underpinned by the AU, UN, regional bodies or other partnerships) can increase the legitimacy of the action whilst spreading the degree of responsibility in the eventuality of a breakdown. This provides a safety net but can bring about the dilemma of incentives for committing resources and energy in consensus building.

The adoption of multilateralism is also essential in the emerging strength of “south-south cooperation” whereby developing nations seek to find among themselves less North-dependent solutions to their problems (Melville & Owen 2005).

Since 1999, wealth creation and security have jumped to the top of the agenda in South Africa’s foreign policy (in detriment of human rights and democracy) (Black 2001:84). These two objectives benefit from multilateral solutions as has been argued by Alden when he calls for a Pretoria-Abuja axis to lead the continent into peace (Alden 2005). In addition, there is the obvious dependence of South Africa in positive economic performances of its peers in Southern Africa that can benefit from multilateral initiatives.

Provide examples of key multilateral or middle power initiatives undertaken by South Africa since 1994. What do these suggest to us of the use of the future direction of South African foreign policy

The Ottawa and Kimberly processes are generally regarded as the pinnacles of South Africa’s multilateral policy. They were of a genuinely global nature but were also of particular significance for South Africa and the African continent as it has been the continent most ravaged by the horrors of mines, small arms and light weapons and by the deals surrounding blood diamonds. In addition, in the case of the Kimberly process, South Africa also has a lot to benefit from a “healthy” diamond industry and the certification programme being as it is a major producer.

In 2001, the NEPAD initiative that South Africa embraced from the start represents so far one of the success stories of African multilateralism and puts South Africa as a major participant in devising a more sustained and coordinated policies when it comes to tackling the interlinked issues of conflict, bad governance and underdevelopment. The organization seeks to go beyond looking at development on a region-by-region basis and devise a vision that attaches the success of the foreign policy of its members, namely South Africa, to its ability to reach out to policies that benefit the continent as a whole. The policy is not however without controversy as NEPAD is also very intimate to western-led efforts of development in Africa and, through budget and political pressure, can sometimes come in the way of South Africa in its more encompassing efforts of transforming the structural relations of power at the international level (Nathan 2005: 372).

In terms of major challenges, South African foreign policy has sometimes been caught adrift between Middlepowership multilateralism, its commitment to democracy and its over-personalization of foreign policy (Nathan 2005: 372). The juggling between these styles of foreign policy has been successful in some cases as in Libyan and East Timorese mediation affairs and not so successful in other cases such as in South Africa’s “silent diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe, in the DRC’s peace negotiations and in the Nigerian debacle. The latter made South Africa thoroughly rethink its way of doing foreign policy becoming less prone to heroic unilateralism and investing more on preparation, consultation and canvassing for its causes.

Multilateralist polices have been guided by a strong will of South Africa to achieve greater leverage at the international stage as a viable, effective and leading deal-broker and agenda-setting power.

The current middle power initiatives tell us that South Africa’s self-identification as a Middle power also helps in defining nature of its role-playing in the international stage and the direction of its policies. For the country to consolidate and further its status it will need however to improve in the quality of its bureaucracy, expertise and human resources comprising the ranks of its foreign office. It probably will do so and it seems that more and more economic and security practical imperatives will also take precedence to what are sometimes the broad and impractical pushes towards advancing human rights and democratization.

What insights can we gain from South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy behaviour to analyse and evaluate other developing countries’ foreign policy? Explain your answer.

Looking at South Africa’s foreign policy with the objective of drawing elations about the foreign policy of other developing countries can be problematic if one considers the particularity of the South African political and economic structures that setting it apart from most other countries in the continent.

The story of South African foreign policy in the 1990s reminds us of the importance of a shared memory and tradition of bargaining and negotiation in the international stage. The lack of this shared socialized memory of negotiation within the setting of international institutions was one of the reasons for some friction with the rest of the developing world (Cornelissen 2006:34).

South Africa’s presses towards debt-forgiveness is better understood not just as another “good Middle-power” multilateral initiative but one that has an underlying South African interest in the regional market whose vitality is essential for South African exports. Understandably, neighbouring developing countries have been reactive to South African Foreign Policy as the major regional player and an essential section of their foreign policy concerns the regional agenda of SADC.

The South African experience shows how multilateralism can be put to use in order to try and achieve “broad foreign policy goals” (Nel et al 2001:5). Developing states can take the South African example in its dynamics, and particularly its learning curve and sets of continuing dilemmas (multilateralism vs. democracy building; rebel vs. reformist) and draw lessons in how to practice foreign policy that simultaneously fosters development at home and calls for structural change in global order. In this sense these lessons can actually be more valuable for other emerging middle powers such as Brazil and India in that some of the dilemmas in the foreign policy interaction between these actors and the West are similar (Melville & Owen 2005).

In sum, understanding South Africa’s foreign policy can help us understand other emerging middle powers foreign policy, the foreign policy of those countries that cooperate and bandwagon with South Africa in its causes as well as the antagonism in the foreign policy of some developing countries towards what they sometimes consider a “state in Africa but not of Africa” (Hamil& Lee 2001: 50)

References

Alden, C. & M. Soko, 2005. ‘South Africa's economic relations with Africa: Hegemony and its discontents’, Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 42, No. 3
Black, D. 2001 “Lever or Cover? South Africa, Multilateral Institutions and the Promotion of Human Rights” in Nel, P., Taylor, I., and Van der Westhuizen, J. South Africa’s Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The limits of reformism. Aldershot: Ashgate
Cornelissen, S., 2006. ‘Displaced multilateralism?’ South Africa’s participation at the United Nations: disjunctures, continuities and contrasts’ in D. Lee and P. Williams (Eds). The new Multilateralism in Post-Apartheid South African Diplomacy. New York: palgrave
Hamill, J. and Lee, D., 2001. A Middle Power Paradox? South African diplomacy in the Post-Apartheid era’. International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 4
Melville, C. & Owen, O. 2005 China and Africa: a new era of “south-south cooperation” Open Democracy www.opendemocracy.org [11May 2007]
Nathan, L., 2005. ‘Consistency and inconsistency in South African foreign policy’. International affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2
Nel, P., Taylor, I and Van der Westhuizen, J., 2001. ‘South Africa multilateral diplomacy and global change: The limits of Reformism. Aldershot: Ashgate

Multilateralism and Foreign Policy

What is meant by multilateralism and, according to some, what role does it play in international relations?

According to Carporaso the study of multilateralism has been underrepresented in the academic world of international relations. Reasons seem to vary. An argument put forward is that actors in International Relations simply tend to not to practice multilateralism (Carporaso 1993:52). Although the years of the Cold War might have justified this reasoning, post-Cold War events in the world stage and the new agendas of economics, environment and complex peacebuilding seem to have altered the nature of files, meetings and cocktails in foreign offices around the world. Has interdependence brought about a definite diffusion of power in international relations and created the perfect environment for multilateralism?

Conceptually, multilateralism fundamentally opposes other ideologies such as: unilateralism, imperialism and regionalism (Nel et al 2001: 5). It is the norms guiding foreign policy, not the number of actors that matter. In practical terms however the practice of foreign policy is messier and the case is more often than not that states in the international system administer packages that mix these modalities in their foreign policy.

The practice of multilateralism privileges issues of time and trust as relevant factors in determining the success of norms, socialization at the international level and cooperation. Under this rational, actors are less likely to free-ride or defect if they know they will lose out in the long run. Hence, the answer to Carporaso’s (1993:55) question of whether multilateralism is a means or an end in international relations is that it can actually be both. It exists at the international realm both as an ideology and as a strategy.

The concept in itself can assume rather different meanings which are important to differentiate in order to correctly read and understand the rational behind the actor’s specific use of the concept. While actors such as Putnam, Ruggie and Keohane recognize the eclectic nature of multilateralism and its meanings they have different takes on their approaches to its role in international relations. These different focuses are condensed by Carporaso into three strands. Keohane’s formal analysis of multilateralism goes beyond the realist-inspired and state-centric 1st strand – the individualist paradigm, adopting the 2nd strand of multilateralism: the social-communicative approach. His Neo-liberal institutionalism updates the systemic “stiffness” of Waltz and focuses on the consequences of the practical rules and norms that multilateral institutions have brought attributing some significance to aspects of communication, language and persuasion.

Ruggie instead seems to adopt the third strand of the institutionalist approach. He instead sees the concept itself as an ideological modus operandi and as having an important role - both in defining and understanding sets of international relations. These sets of international relations that multilateralism comprises go beyond the rigidity and formality of monolithic institutions and have as corollaries indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity (Ruggie 1993: 11). The actors in the international system are actually understood as having the potential to discuss and interact in a forum rather than invariably competing in a “chess-board”. While in a forum, actors constantly recreate themselves, adapt and alter the rules of the game in contrast to the strict relative-gains rules of the Realist game of chess.

How you understand the reasons for states to behave in a multilateral way also has an important role in defining what your understanding of the nature of international relations is. A structural explanation of multilateralism will be markedly different from a functional one. In a structural explanation multilateralism will be seen as the independent variable while in a functional analysis multilateralism comes as the product of rational-actor behaviour that minimizes information costs and curbs inefficiency.

Overall, the strength of looking at international relations through the lenses of multilateralist approaches is that you are better equipped to understand and analyse the dynamic processes of socializing occurring between states and other international actors.

Is there a relationship between middlepowership and multilateralism? If so, how and why?

Some of the first questions that arise when going through the literature on middle powers is a question about its utility. What is it for? So what if a state is a middle power? What is the use of classifying a country as a middle power and give it an ambiguous definition such as “states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world order” (Jordaan 165: 2003)? Who decides and how consistent is the consensus over which states are middle powers or not?

The answers to these questions are difficult and problematic however one of the definite uses for the topologies of middle powers is in analysing the empirical products of multilateralism. Indeed, the sub-categories of middlepowermanship advanced by Jordaan and Cooper are useful analytical tools for analysing international relations. Classifying middle powers by “their foreign policy behaviour” (Jordaan 166) can, however be problematic. Evidence is on the three possible approaches to the concept. There are some alternatives that offer an alternative conceptualization of middle power: functional and hierarchical approaches (Chapnick 1999). These compete with this behaviour approach for explanatory power. The behavioural approach appears to be the most nuanced approach despite having to put aside essential players in the international domain such as China and India, discarding them as not being middle powers by summarily describing them as economic deviants and non-Western nuclear powers respectively. (Jordaan 2003:167) This subsequently ignores their important role in bringing about a more multipolar and multilateral-based world. The hierarchical and functional takes on middle powers in effect reject the basic link that Jordaan establishes between middle powers and multilateralism (the practice of multilateralism turns you into a middle power if you are benevolent and influential enough) and see instead its practice, not as a pre-condition for being a middle power but instead, as a likely behaviour and a useful tool for the success of emerging powers. (Chapnick 1999)

If one accepts the behaviouralist approach, in a post-Cold war era the more established middle powers become in the international system the more prevalent multilateralism seems to become (Cooper 1997: 4). The motives for this have to do with how at ease middle powers are in adapting to a multi-tiered international realm where issues do not concern solely security and power anymore. Middle powers thrive in niche diplomacy and have a recognizable role in their respective regional slots (which are not always bounded by geographical proximity), often standing as Cox observes “in the middle in situations of conflict” (1989:244). Overall, domination is less clear-cut and hardly absolute in an interdependent world. A power may even be a leading figure in the military sphere while simultaneously difficulties in the economic and cultural sphere undermine its international projection.

The case of Portugal is illustrative. Although its status as a middle power is again disputable (as is actually the case for most middle powers), it undoubtedly seeks to affirm itself using multilateralism and improve its international status. If one looks at Portuguese foreign policy since the end of the 1980s one can observe that the country has aimed at creating in the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries) a niche where it can affirm itself distinctively vis-à-vis other European Union powers. The CPLP as an organization constitutes an example whereby Brazil and Portugal in particular strive to enhance their international leverage in term of economic competitiveness and political standing. They do so by creating foreign policy synergies at the economic and political levels by means of a common cultural platform – in this case a shared language.

At a more global level, the push towards multilateralism can most obviously be noticed in the current pushes by middle powers such as South Africa and Brazil towards a reform of the United Nations Security council. This leads to the last link of “how” multilateralism and middle power are linked. Institutions have traditionally be seen as one of the “vehicles through which middle power initiative help form such world order” (Cox 1989:250). Brazil’s and South Africa’s pushes towards reform fall into the will of middle powers to set up an international architecture of power that is “forum-like” and fosters cooperation and solution-making as opposed to zero-sum moves in an international chessboard. This represents the essence of multilateralism.

References

Carporaso, J. 1993 ‘International Relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations’ in J. Ruggie (ed.) Multilateralism Matters: The theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form New York: Columbia University Press
Chapnick, A. 1999 “The Middle Power” in Canadian Foreign Policy Vol. 7 No.2
Cooper, A. 1997 Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War New York: St. Martin’s press
Keohane, R. 1990 ‘Multilateralism: an agenda for research’ International Journal, 45, 4
Nel, P.; Taylor, I.; van der Westhuizen, J. 2001 “Reformist Initiatives and South Africa’s Multilateral Diplomacy” a Framework for Understanding” in Nel, P.; Taylor, I.; van der Westhuizen, J. South Africa’s Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The lmits of reformism Aldershot: Ashgate
Ruggie, A. 1993 “Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution,’ in J. G. Ruggie (ed.) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form New York: Columbia University Press
Jordaan, E., 2003. ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers’. Politicon. Vol. 30, No. 2, 165-181

Reading log - Multilateralism: The anatomy of an institution – John Gerard Ruggie (1992)

New institutionalism – focus on cooperation and institutions in a generic sense, with international regimes and formal organizations as specific institutional subsets

6 Ruggie is concerned with the kinds of relations, the qualitative characteristics of multilateralism

7 what is distinctive about multilateralism is that it coordinates policies on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states

multilateralism is a generic institutional form of modern international life

8, 11 as its core, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance to certain principles: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.

11 Two corollaries: Indivisibility; Diffuse reciprocity – rough equivalent of benefits in the aggregate over time

Three institutional domains of interstate relations:

international economic orders – multilateralism here refers to the constitutive rules that order relations in given domains of international life – character 0of an overall order of relations

international regimes – encompasses more of the “how” question, it is used to refer to common, deliberative, though often asymmetrical means of conducting interstate relations.

International organizations – palpable entities with headquarters – some were not multilateral in nature, “multilateral organization” is a distinct type of institutionalized behaviour

16 Coordination problem – wherein states are more or less indifferent in principle about the actual outcome, provided only that all accept the same outcome

19th century example – Lessons:

21
• defining and delimiting property rights of states is as fundamental a collective task as any in the international system
• successful multilateralism exhibits “diffuse reciprocity” – each state has to believe that its current sacrifices yield a long-term return
• before 20th century few instances of multilateralism generated formal organizations

Consequences of move to institutions in multilateralism:

• Complicated in some instances straightforward ends-means relations, created principal-agent problems
• Multilateral forums share agenda-setting and convening power of states
• Multilateral diplomacy has come to embody a procedural norm in its own right

Explanations for American multilateralism:
Structural – focus on U.S hegemony or on strategic bipolarity as independent variables
Functional – concerned with factors as the desire to minimise transaction and information costs and similar institutional inefficiencies

34 k-groups – major postwar global regimes have been governed by what Snidel terms “minilateralist” groupings within them

35 international institutional order appears robust and adaptive

Reading log - James A. Carporaso - IR and Multilateralism: The Search for foundations (1992)

52 Multilateralism in itself is rarely used as an explanatory concept. In research where the focus is multilateralism, cooperation and institutions usually turn out to serve as explanandum.

Are cooperation and institutions direct explanatory competitors of multilateralism?

53 multilateralism – an organizing principle, the institution of multilateralism is distinguished from other forms by three properties: indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.

Issues of time and trust are relevant factors in determining the success of norms, socialization at the international level and cooperation. Under this rational, actors are less likely to free-ride or defect if they know they will lose out in the long run.


Multilateral institutions – focus on formal organizational elements of international life characterized by permanent locations and postal addresses.

Vs.

Institution of Multilateralism goes beyond formality. 54 institution of multilateralism - is grounded in and appeals to the less formal, less codified habits, practices, ideas, and norms of international society.

Two reasons to maintain distinction: multilateral institutions and the institutions of multilateralism do not always mirror each other; the two can be related in complex cause-and-effect ways. It is a chicken and egg situation.

Three uses of the term “multilateral”: an organizing principle; an organization; or simply an activity.

55 Multilateralism is a belief that activities ought to be organized on a universal basis at least for a “relevant” group, a belief that can both be existential and normative. Multilateralism is an ideology “designed” to promote multilateral activity.

Implication of definition: term “multilateral” does not presuppose a particular number of countries; definition presupposes cooperation

Instrumental theory – cooperation a process by which states adjust their policies to take into account the preferences of other

Game-theory – cooperation represents an effort to take into account other players’ interests

Question arises as to whether multilateralism is a means or an end, an instrument or an expression, or both.

56 (Ruggie) – multilateralism is a demanding organizational form. It requires participants to renounce temporary advantages and the temptation to define interests narrowly in terms of national interests, it also requires them to forgo ad hoc coalitions and to avoid policies based on situational exigencies and momentary constellations of interests.

The issue of time and long-term is present again.

57 Three routes to Multilateralism:

individualist paradigm of state-centric realism, struggles with cooperation; social-communicative approach – state-centric “interaction repertoires”, includes some communication, persuasion, deliberation, and self-reflection; institutional approach – not necessarily individualist, preferences are not exogenous, social relations not products of individual self-interested calculations.


Individualist paradigm

61 Transaction costs – costs incurred in exchange, including the costs of acquiring information, bargaining and enforcement, as well as the opportunity cost of the time allocated to these activities. These costs almost certainly increase with an increase in actors.

62 (Keohane) political economies of scale – gains in multilateral institutions may be Smithian, deriving from same advantages that make factory production more efficient than individual production, such as decreasing the amount of time and resources wasted in moving between different points of production.

After Hegemony - Regimes: cheaper for governments to negotiate agreements; provide administrative help; create a set of rules and procedures for dealing with problems, collect and standardize information, codify rules and practices, attempt to increase transparency; facilitate sanctioning

Coordination games – strong incentive to reach an agreement and little incentive to depart from it
Cooperation games – strong incentive for deference 64 norms of diffuse reciprocity and indivisibility require unconditional cooperation and may discourage the specific detection and selective punishment required for tit-for-tat strategies – opportunistic behaviour and free riding can therefore be more effectively dealt with through bilateral arrangements than multilateral ones.

There is a tension between the highly generalized norms of multilateralism on the one hand and the specific knowledge and actions required to enforce complex agreements on the other.

Economic hostages – binding precommitments to invest in assets that are specific to a transaction and to a partner

65 Non-cooperative games – rules, agents, and the preferences, beliefs, and choices of agents are established by assumption. Defection is dominant strategy
Social-communicative approach

66 The Social approach does not throw out individual rationality, it situates it and broadens it. Focus is on how the choosing agent reflects, discusses, trusts and distrusts, tries to build consensus, alters others’ perceptions of the world, and , in general, uses his capacities as a social being to identify problems, solve them, and shape the environment.

68 Putnam – interest and power important but ability to change perceptions of interest using technical knowledge was important as well

minimal contributing set – smallest number of actors who together could provide a public good if they were willing to do so.

70 – cooperation rates can be radically affected by one factor in particular that is independent of the consequences for the choosing individual – that factor is group identity

If established, identity can enhance cooperation responding in the absence of any expectation of future reciprocity, it operates independently of the dictates of conscience.

73 Why is unanimity apparently so important? Groups tend to push towards universality because: it eliminates free-riding, diminishes obstacles that envy and relative deprivation might throw up, and is equitable.

Institutional Approaches

New economics of organization (Coase)- economic institutions as reducing transaction costs involved in certain types of market exchange

74 Criticises choice-theoretic approaches for taking preference and rules as given, neglecting ways in which institutions shape preferences

Three components:

• ontological – accepts holism explains individual behaviour by reference to “institutional facts” rather than to characteristics of individuals per se, choice is part of the given environment, agency is given a structural determination;
• theoretical – norms, believes and rules occupy a central position, political process is a forum within which preferences and beliefs change, help shape preference by changing the payoff matrix (easier to punish free-riders);
• interpretive – cooperation is already embedded within states and the interstate system, rules, norms and cooperation are actually constitutive of the identities and power of agents, institutions not chosen on rational basis but product of trial and error

77 norms – prescriptions lying outside the preference structures

79 Path dependency (Gerschenkron) importance of the timing of entry into the international market is for development. Contingency, many different institutional worlds are possible.

81 Ruggie – concentration of power may make it easier to solve collective action problems, but it tells us nothing about the content of the regime

Conclusion

The sociality of states – manner in which states acknowledge and contribute to international society

83 – institutional approach defocalizes interest