Showing posts with label new wars. Show all posts
Showing posts with label new wars. Show all posts

5.12.06


Chabal and Daloz (1999:83) write that 'there are essentially two types of conflicts in contemporary Africa: the political and the criminal'. This consists in a discussion of this distinction, drawing upon a variety of readings.



Introduction

The literature of Conflict and Peace Studies in which the discussion of this distinction is inserted has expanded from the 1990s onwards as the end of the Cold War witnessed a wave of peacebuilding interventions that focused attention on causes and processes of conflict. As the study of conflict moved beyond its focus on Cold War game theory and state-centric strategy, Galtung’s (1964) discipline of Peace studies cemented its position in the social sciences as the hub moving the debate of the study of conflict and peace towards its next level. The discipline moved beyond the strategic aspect of war, challenging state-centrism and also looking at the inherent contradictions and rationalities of conflict at the sub-national, transnational and global levels. From studying how to do well in a conflict as a state, the discipline moved to understanding conflict as a less state-dependant subject. Chabal & Daloz’ distinction between political and criminal conflict can be seen as part of one of the debates set at the latest stage of the discipline – the question over greed and grievance as causal factors of conflict. The discussion over the distinction is divided in two: firstly an assessment of the logical steps taken by the author leading up to the distinction and secondly, drawing on a variety of readings such as Macwilwaine’s (2006) and Boas’ (2005), look at policy implications and possible alternatives to this two-way label.

Political and criminal conflict – assessing the logical coherence of the distinction

“There are in African societies well-understood, if not always well-defined, rules of conduct which mark clear boundaries between the informal sector and the criminal world. The informal may be illicit but it is legitimate because it rests on a principle of common clientelistic accountability. The criminal is illegitimate because it is unaccountable and based only on duress”

(Chabal&Daloz 1998:81)

Chabal and Daloz’ study provides a strong analytical discussion of how to understand crime, legitimacy and legality in Africa. Firstly, looking at the concept of crime itself can be problematic, does it represent committing an illegal act or is it actually perpetrating something illegitimate? The authors put forward an analytically useful argument that criminality in Africa is identified by its illegitimacy and unaccountability and not by its informality. This analysis provides a better understanding of the processes of power-sharing and the so-called “moral economy” of Africa, alluding to the “networks which seek to organize and make productive the high level of violence found in African societies” (Chabal&Daloz 1998:78). Nevertheless, at some point, this analysis transforms into a dichotomy dividing conflicts into political or criminal that is unsatisfactory.

Their argument is that the growing unaccountability of political life during the 1990s in Africa inevitably leads to counter-measures of “tribalism and witchcraft” and that the “use of identity or the irrational as a weapon for survival, or counter-attack, makes eminent sense”. The problem here is that this is not always necessarily the case with most conflicts. The authors assert that we are before a criminal faction or conflict when those committing the violence are seen as illegitimate (Chabal&Daloz 1998:81). This link to the next component of their argument is not fully convincing since it can be problematic to establish a threshold of how much illegitimacy is actually needed in order for a faction or conflict to be considered criminal. Giving the example that in Zaire there were “enough” civilians looking at violence while in Angola there were not is not satisfactory or systematic. To claim that what you need is for “those who are engulfed in the conflict” (Chabal&Daloz 1998:83) to see it as illegitimate is not enough because this imprecision can lead both to conceptual confusion and ethical problems. Conceptual confusion because it does not make it explicit who exactly are those engulfed by the conflict - is it just civilians or are transnational corporations, states, international organizations and traders part of it as well? Ethical problems on the grounds that the causes for distrust and illegitimacy are not always clear and uniform. In effect, a majority of the population may affirm that a faction with sound moral claims to advance the rights of a minority is in fact illegitimate and criminal. The criterion determining legitimacy and illegitimacy is fragile.

If Chabal and Daloz do recognize the role of patrons as operating simultaneously in the world of politics, economy and crime (Chabal&Daloz 1998:80) why then should they establish a dichotomy between criminal and political conflicts where the former is causal of the latter? The relation is essentially dialectical between the two perspectives, not uni-causal. That being said, the main question related to the logical coherence of the argument linking patronage networks to the criminal/political conflict distinction is: why is it the case that “politics becomes criminalized” (Chabal&Daloz 1998:84) and not that it is actually crime that becomes politicized? Again, the relation is not uni-causal meaning that hardly a conflict is criminal in such absolute terms that it is accurate to label it a “criminal conflict”. It is therefore quite striking how, after noting the complex relations between the criminal and political spheres, the authors conclude with a distinction between political and criminal conflicts. The indivisibility between the practical aspects of crime, violence and political conflict can instead be seen as a more consistent outcome of their initial discussion over legitimacy and informality in Africa.

In this sense, an important question to consider is if criminality is understood as politics or not. If it is, accepting conflict as either political or criminal represents not just a misunderstanding but also a logical fallacy. Chabal and Daloz initially set up their argument by suggesting that increases in thieving, harassment, thuggering, extortion, armed robbery, murder and war are “endemic” to an accomplice African state that is increasingly “urbanized” and “frightening”. Again, understanding conflict in Africa as increasingly violent, diverse and urbanized is different from understanding it as apolitical or endemic. Accepting an urbanization and informalisation of conflict does not entail accepting conflict as simply criminalised. Stating that political and criminal conflicts in Africa “are in effect nothing but the continuation by other means of the violence of everyday life” assumes that the violence of everyday life precedes conflict. This judgment does not accurately capture what is in fact a dialectical relationship between everyday brutality and organized violence, contradicting their previously mentioned assumption that there is an overlap between the political and the criminal world (Chabal&Daloz 1998:83).

Criminal conflict as a label - implications and alternatives

“The true case of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed”

(Collier 2000: 99)

Assigning typologies, labels and tags to conflicts is, for policy-makers, as problematic as it is fundamental. Understanding different conflicts as political or as criminal for example withholds concrete policy implications given that one deals with actors with a political claim differently from those seen as criminal. Criminal actors are thugs, assumed not to hold a viable political agenda that can be subject to negotiation whilst recognized political groups, even if rebel ones, have that potential. This is the essence of the greed and grievance debate – do groups represent greedy thugs or rebels with a cause? Considering this, Chabal and Daloz’ distinction of political/criminal conflict sees them subject to what has been seen as the “new barbarism” thesis (Tuastad 2003) whereby an embedded African violent culture is seen as the explanation for violence in general and civil wars in particular. This simplification has its corollary in the influential Robert Kaplan (1994) who exposes, in a flux of sensorial rhetoric, an African wild west of anarchy as the independent variable causing violence. This outlook visibly omits “political and economic interests and contexts when describing that violence” (Tuastag 2003:592). Labels such as “criminal conflict” contribute to this kind of omission. So, if it is undisputable that structures recognised by Chabal as patrimonial are in place and the opportunities for violence dealers in Africa have increased. The overlaps between overt and covert violence and between private and public violence should not imply a label of these conflicts as criminal. This is distant from reality and it also is not desirable for effective policy-making and addressing the social dynamics violence.

If you take greed and grievance as two opposite sides of a continuum that aims at illustrating causes of war, grievance would point out to the historical narrative of resentment in the conflict. At the same time greed would stress the underlying material conditions determining the likelihood of conflict and throwing some places as customarily violent-prone and others less so. This different take on the drivers of conflict was prompted by a seminal piece by Collier (later updated with Hoeffler) that turned a traditionally grievance-based understanding of conflict around and challenged it (Collier 2000) (Collier&Hoeffler 2004). Collier resorted to data sets such as the one composed by PRIO and Uppsala University (Gleditsch et al 2002) on past conflicts to claim that despite the “loud discourse of grievance” the underlying forces driving contemporary conflict were less heard of but more measurable. Conflict-proneness could be gauged by looking at four specific aspects: primary commodities; proportion of young men in society; endowment of education; and economic decline. (Collier 2000:95). On similar lines, Mueller (2003:508) despises religion and culture as excuses for violence which he labels as a product of the “remnants of war”. Factions and actors in these settings greedily profit from the culture of the thug.

On the opposite side of the continuum, authors such as Boas look at the resilience of patrimonial structures in a more transhistorical and chronic manner. Focusing on ancient tensions replicated in the present. Conflicts are to be resolved only if old grieves are addressed, only if stories, claims and relations are understood and dealt with well enough. His critique of the Collier and Mueller greed literature as solely looking at the new materiality of war and war spoilers is partially applicable to Chabal and Daloz’ distinction between political and criminal conflict (Boas 2005:78). Given this, the political/criminal distinction also lacked the understanding of an important tension present in sub-Saharan Africa that is put forward by Stephen Jackson - that is the blurriness between an economy of criminality and an economy of coping. The example of the Kivus in the Democratic Republic of Congo shows how, from the moment that a conflict is labelled as criminal, the actions of all actors taking part in the informal economy funding the armed factions are understood as criminal. This disregards how the livelihoods of many average Congolese are greatly dependant on the commerce of, for example, coltan. Acknowledging that factions recur to methods traditionally used by criminal organizations does not immediately render the conflict criminal instead of political. The case is that often, innovative criminal features constitute an adaptation to conditions on the ground. The overarching label of the conflict as criminal is therefore unsatisfactory at the individual level since, to use the words of Jackson, the line between individuals dwelling in criminality and those coping with their surrounding system of power is not drawn (Jackson 2005:531).

This aspect is further reinforced by Herbst when he points out to the frequent mistakes by the intelligence of African militaries in distinguishing insurgents from criminals. This has practical strategic implications to how conflicts and tensions later evolve in the continent as these mistakes are paid dearly. Examples of this are sudden rises in popularity and strength of once obscure rebel groups stimulated by a disproportionate violent reaction by the state authority. An example has been the story of the conflict between the Liberian government and Charles Taylor’s initial incursion from Cote d’Ivoire into Liberia in 1989. The latter was able to gain mounting support the more asymmetrical the government’s response was (Herbst 2004:361). That being said, it is of utmost importance not to confuse the recent role of informal networks and transnationalism in civil wars (Kaldor 2001:3) as an automatic transformation of some political conflicts into criminal ones. Claiming that a conflict is criminal simply because one finds the same aspects of international crime in them is not enough to establish such a distinction. If on the one hand grievances are not always new, on the other hand new phenomena including the Diaspora, humanitarian aid, small arms trade and money laundering are just some of recent developments that have transformed the way wars are waged and sustained. Money laundering and arms smuggling are not simply criminal activities but they are also extremely political. The case of small arms trade is illustrative as can be observed in the article by Khakee et al (2006) looking at the implications of the macro-political economy of conflict. The article makes evident the role of the United Nations small arms survey and the changes in the tricky relations between: companies producing arms; the organizations (be it states or other) that export and import them; and those who actually use them. So, if the end-product appears to be an abundance of small arms “facilitating banditry and robbery, for example, in Mozambique” (Kingma 2002:191), fact remains that the background leading up to and sustaining the conflict remains political and not just criminal.

Finally, a possible alternative to the political/criminal conflict dichotomy can be to look at violence in a multiple faceted framework. An example of violence as comprising economic, political, institutional and, most importantly, social dimensions can seen in Moser and Macwilwaine’s work (2006:96). Actions taking place in conflicts and places that are incomprehensible and barbaric on the surface should be looked at not just as criminal violence but in fact as social violence. Labelling needless daily violence as criminal in the social jungle of violence is easy. Better understanding it by navigating (Vigh&White 2003) through the jungle of multiple social processes is the challenge that all the research concerning violence and conflict should be increasingly taking upon.

Conclusion

There has been in conflict studies a trend for violent conflict to be dissected and understood in its causes as well as in the mechanisms triggering, supporting and prolonging it. Chabal and Daloz’ distinction comes across in this context. It is as an attempt at seeding out classic types of conflict where groups hold an essentially legitimate political claim from a type of a virulent violent conflict that is void of organized politics but rich in organized crime – a kind of conflict that comes across as thuggish, virulent and manipulative. The better understandings brought about by disciplines such as political psychology, anthropology and human geography should contribute to a better analysis of the arguments put forward by the old “core” disciplines of international relations, politics and economics. This helps breaking down labels such as political/economic conflict, challenging them and striving for making them more nuanced.

Drawing on some of this multi-disciplinary literature it is possible to reject this distinction between criminal and political as the criminal aspect is often a complementary extension of the political. It is firstly too problematic to deduct that there is “enough” unaccountability and illegitimacy in a conflict for it to be termed criminal. Secondly, if responding to violence with violence and to patronage and corruption with patronage and corruption does have a rational of its own there are also alternatives to these reactions. It can also “makes imminent sense” (Chabal&Daloz 1998:81) for individuals and groups in the toughest of situations to try and build up structures of civil society, to reinforce legal systems and progressively move from a system characterized by relative gains to one of collective absolute gains. This claim is vigorously defended by the current literature on peacebuilding strategy from below (Ramsbotham et al 2005). The vicious cycle is not unbreakable and violence is not endemic but embedded and circumstantial, comprising both political and criminal dimensions that are not mutually exclusive.

References

Kaldor, M. 2001. New Wars and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era Oxford: Polity

Vigh, H. and Whyte, S.R. 2003. Navigating Terrains of War. Youth and Soldiering in Guinea-Bissau. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Copenhagen: Institute of Anthropolgy

19.10.06

War: making regimes and unravelling states


The thoughts and reactions on this reflection are divided in two sections. Firstly, based on Boas (2005) article on Liberia, I argue that “new wars” (Kaldor, 2001) should not be seen as clearly belonging to the pool of ‘greed’ literature. Secondly, I will look at state formation theory as another indicator of some specific dynamics of contemporary conflict, of how we have moved from the evolutions of state Darwinism to the dynamics of regime Darwinism.

‘New Wars’ meet Grievance Literature

After reading the narrative of Liberia’s history I almost can’t help but look towards the role of neopatrimonialism (Boas, 2005:78) as preponderant, chronic and almost transhistorical. This fist impression was followed by a suspicion that there must also be a distinctly modern aspect to neopatrimonialism, something else about its dynamics that cannot be fully understood by just looking at old grievances. I felt that it was also important to understand what was it about the contemporary system that seemed to sustain and cement this approach to politics.
Boas traces tensions in Liberia all the way back to the early 19th century and there is not doubt that having 110 years of a one-party apartheid state (Boas, 2005:76) leaves deep marks but, overall, I still felt that depicting Kaldor’s (2001) ‘new wars’ as obsessed with “material explanations” and as “one-sided” (Boas, 2005:24) is somewhat caricaturizing her argument. If on the one hand I see authors like Collier (2004) as clearly on the greed side of the debate on the other hand Kaldor’s positioning is not as clear or as materially obsessed as it is said to be. In fact, she argues that ‘new wars’ are fundamentally about identity politics, meaning they represent reignited old grievances emerging in the context of globalisation. The ‘newness’ to which Kaldor refers to has been subject to intense debate but I don’t see it in any way denying that in Liberia the “conflict lines around which the war initially started remain very much present” (Boas: 2005 82) . In fact what it asks is for ‘new wars’ to be “understood in the context of the process known as globalisation” (Kaldor: 2001, 3). Hence, the term ‘new war’ is not intended to indicate that all wars have been transformed into new wars but that some conflicts are underpinned by fundamentally different elements. The two main elements referred to in this case are the role of informal networks and transnationalism. If on the one hand informal networks with their specific structures and grievances are not always new, on the other hand the transnational phenomena of Diaspora, humanitarian aid, small arms trade and money laundering are just some of recent developments that have transformed the way wars are waged and sustained. Kaldor’s term is also not suppose to extend to other forms of conflict such as terrorism, but stick to how specificities of contemporary warfare seem to make the ages-old cleavages described by Boas more salient. It is therefore important to point out that ‘New Wars’ refer to a very specific form of conflict, according to Mary Kaldor (2005) these are wars

“fought by networks of state and nonstate actors, where battles are rare and violence is directed mainly against civilians, and which are characterised by a new type of political economy that combines extremist politics and criminality”.

In contrast to the situation before the end of the Cold War, where ethnic grievances had been kept dormant by the geopolitical and ideological ‘chess’, these grievances today thrive in a world where informal networks and transnationalism are frequently put together with geopolitical fragmentation and economic turbulence. How does this process work? How can one explain why Hutu militia embarked on a genocidal campaign if they were already in power in Rwanda? Was the Bosnian conflict’s grievances so entrenched that a conflict was inevitable? It appears to me that in the Rwandan case the ethnic grievances that remained from colonialism did provide powerful identifiers of community but were triggered by very specific contemporary economic and political insecurities while ethnic nationalism in the Bosnian case was a form of responding to the instability induced by democratisation, political insecurity and economic difficulties. In addition, new uses for old technology or simple new innovations such as mobile phones, internet or a Toyota Hiace with an attached machine gun can deeply change the form conflicts are waged, facilitating the job of factions that rely on informal networks – the whole Rwanda genocide for example was carried out with little more than machetes whilst radio media is said to have played a key role in inciting violence. Take also the Liberian example, Charles Taylor, an economics student in the United States and a Khadafy trainee in Libya was able to set up a political network and begin a successful invasion of a nation-state with a small number of soldiers (100). Even this case is, I believe, illustrative of how today informal networks are wider and more salient in affecting conflict while transnationalism takes the vulnerabilities of failed states to a different level. Charles Taylor was able to tap into pre-existing ethnic grievances and carry out a war sustained by platforms allocated at the global level (exe. diamond, timber and rubber industries) and trends existing at a regional scale (exe. Sankoh’s and Gadaffi’s anti-western doctrines and informal commercial networks). One last example of the changed nature of conflicts can be found if you look at the case of “Africa’s World War” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A conflict of this nature could not have happened at any previous moment in history and assumed the form it did. The fact that nine countries were involved, that there was an extensive network of coordination between the factions and that the effort of war did not have territorial conquest in mind is relevant. In DRC, political goals of the intervening actors were constantly intermeshed with economic interests of extraction and business. The prospect of business and the rush of stakeholders went hand in hand with the daily routine of the war and was an intrinsic part of its sustenance. Once again the role of informal networks and transnationalism was evident, informal forces thrive on the de-territorialisation and transnationality associated with globalisation. These informal forces also tend to blossom across some relatively novel characters in international relations – the failed states. It is towards the failed state we turn next.

State Darwinism vs. Regime Darwinism

From the perspective of a researcher in the area of conflict, the “new wars”/old wars debate, put together with questions of state formation add up to one of the most fascinating mixes in the subject. Personally, the huge pressure that ongoing geopolitical fragmentation has exercised on an international system whose foundations rest upon a state-based template is particularly interesting. This nation-state template works at its best when dealing with formal sovereign states but has been struggling, particularly in Africa, where it has to deal with weak states managed by ‘muscled’ regimes and by the recurrence of protracted conflict. These are the so-called failed states.
In an insightful work, Herbst (2004:308) notes that there has not been a process of natural selection in terms of state capabilities in Africa since the “political existence of states was no longer necessarily threatened by failure”. Indeed what has occurred instead, in my perspective, is a process of natural selection of which regimes hold power. It is here where the problem lies since the criteria for a ‘muscled’ regime is different of the criteria for a strong state. Failed states hold regimes where the first decisive factor for natural selection is military capability and secondly, when in power, ability to keep in place a patrimonial structure that makes the most of an informal underground sector or/and an unaccountable primary commodity export sector (Liberia from Tubman to Charles Taylor is one example). All of this whilst, of course, managing to keep any forms of civil unrest on the low. Eriksen, for example, is quick in recognizing the essentially distinct new nature of conflict in Africa when he observes that states in themselves “are not faced with the threat of extinction (Eriksen: 2005: 1110). War does not destroy or make states (Tilly, 1985) as it used to. What you have now are direct battles between regimes, regime-seekers or stakeholder regime-establishers (like for example Angola and Libya in the DRC war) instead of simple inter-state battle. Herbst’s (2004 310) remark that “regimes do not require national political order” supports this, he pushes for an understanding of political order in terms of administrative accountability and control of the territorial extension of the state. These would be pre-requisites for states to be considered sovereign and would prevent regime-seekers from ripping out the benefits of belonging to the international community as soon as they control the capital city. Situations where leaders and policy-makers in developing countries perceive an empowerment of the state as counter-productive to the strengthening of the regime need to be avoided.
Ultimately, Herbst’s (2004:312) suggestion for the international community to decertify states (not recognize them as sovereign) did strike me as ambiguous and impractical but I also could see that it was a product of a logical reasoning exercise. In failed states there seems to be a parallel structure of neopatrimonialism that uses the old state template of the international order as a platform for sustenance. In order for a regime-seeker faction to tap into this template, not only re-igniting old grievances seems to be particularly effective but above all, the ability to log into the international economy (formal or informal), into transnational networks as well as seizing strategic nodal points (instead of large extensions of territory) such as capital cities and river basins.

Conclusion

In his concluding remarks, Boas (2005:88) calls for more attention towards the “ideational aspects of war” as vital towards better understanding and engaging with the implicit, underlying causes of conflict. I strongly agree with this point but I also believe that the sought after holistic approach needs to be complemented with politics tackling the explicit new practicalities of contemporary conflicts. At the end of the day, next to ideation you have to put practicality. Yes, the conflicts are ancient and the grievances are not a sudden ‘disease’ of a post-Cold War world but the expansion of informal networks and transnationalism have surely worked as fast-track incubators for protracted conflicts during the 1990s and the beginning of the millennium.
By assuming this, I consider Kaldor’s notion of “New Wars” as successful in mapping the new transnational, commercial and informal saliencies of modern warfare, contributing towards a more complete sketch of what the current challenges entail. Also, analysing state formation can, as we saw, make this evident. Reading Herbst and complementing the two texts I feel that it is perhaps time to move from the classic argument that states make war and “war makes states” (Tilly, 1985:171) to a situation where regime-stakeholders make war and war both makes regimes and unravels states.


References

Boas, M. 2005. “The Liberian civil war: new war/old war?” in Global Society, 19(1): 73-88
Collier, P. 2000. “Doing well out of war: An economic perspective”, in Berdal, M. & Malone, D. (eds.) Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars. Boulder: Lynne Rienner (91-112)
Eriksen, S. 2005. “The Congo war and the prospects for state formation: Rwanda and Uganda compared” in Third World Quarterly, 26(7): 1097-1113
Herbst, J. 2004. “Let them fail”, in Rotberg, R. (ed.) When states fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton University Press (302-318)
Kaldor, M. 2001. New Wars and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era Oxford: Polity
Kaldor, M. 2005. “Iraq: the wrong war” in Open Democracy (online edition), 9 June. http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/wrong_war_2591.jsp (13 October 2006)
Tilly, C. 1985. “War Making and State Making as organised crime” in Evans, P.; Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. (eds) Bringing the State back in Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (169-187)