12.1.07

It didn’t happen here. Why post-1974 Liberalism never materialized in the form of a Liberal Party in Portugal


Introduction

What can an absence explain? What does thinking about “something that never seems to have been” bring of added value to political research? Why bother doing so when you can simply stick with what is there, why is there, and what is there to come? These were the big challenges on our mind when initiating this piece to which we hope to, in the end, have come up with some fairly satisfactory answers or at the very least some better questions. We had two motors, two aides and two goals at the inception of the argument.
The motors were:
1. An observation that there were currently no Portuguese political parties that are members of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) family;
2. A craving to put a 3 year politics degree (taken in Sussex) in context with a Portuguese background, focusing a bit more on a case that was up to this point more familiar yet under-researched on our behalf.
As aides, they came in the form of two different pieces:
1. Lipset and Marks’s book “It didn’t happen here”[1] discussing the reasons why successful socialism had failed in the United States, where we found inspiration and the structural design to divide and orient this research, the sub-topics of this dissertation were partially drawn from some chapters of this book;
2. An ongoing piece by Tim Bale and Aleks Szcerbiak on the inexistence of a Christian Democrat Party in Poland, more than helping us structure our argument this research helped us in having a better notion of the patterns and issues we needed to be looking for during the project.
Lastly, our two goals consisted of:
1. Providing a fresh, synthetic look at the narrative of the Portuguese party system, not only in terms of its systemic and structural evolution but also regarding its historical-cultural nature. This snapshot would provide a different angle arising out of the analysis of a party-type concealed within a designated ideological framework – the Liberal Party;
2. Assess the form in which liberalism has been at play in Portuguese party politics, understanding the importance of defining historical moments in the formation of parties and party systems and accounting for the current perspectives of future evolutions.
In the first section, after putting forward our argument, the following step is simultaneously the most important and problematic one. We need to put boundaries around the target absentee we wish to analyse. The boundary will be twofold: after having put forward our definition of the object of liberalism in section 1 we provide a broad definition of strategic party-Liberalism, choosing as comparative models Liberal parties from around Europe and Kirchner’s criteria in order to, afterwards, be able to contrast these with the Portuguese case (of diluted Party Liberalism). As the argument develops into section 3 we will see that it was not the case that Portugal was simply left out of the fluxes of Liberalism roaming through Europe in the last 200 years, on the contrary, it was often an actor, shaper and reproducer of several Liberal trends. If this is in fact the case, why then, is the presence of Liberalism in party politics so surreptitious? Why isn’t there a party that, in the words of Adelino Maltez[2], “not only proclaims that it wants to liberalize us but that actually says that it is Liberal”. Our answer will be underpinned by the analytical presentation of what we see as two groups of constitutional politics junctions determining the contemporary absence of explicit party Liberalism. Based on Pierson’s[3] notions of path dependency (described in section 1) we set out on a journey that takes us from the general story and characteristics of Liberal parties across Europe (in section 2) delineating what “animal” this is we are analysing, to a mini-chronology of Portuguese history focusing on the build-up of party-Liberalism in the country until the present day (in section 3). Sections 2 and 3 are the core sections of this dissertation providing the two guiding vectors of our argument.
Section 2 focuses on the first group of constitutional politics where two self-reinforcing forces are at play: the dual moments of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the process of European integration which in tune carried out a consolidation of the liberal consensus[4] and embraced Portugal in externally-led steps of liberalization. The effect of these on the party system was preventing the arrival of the cleavages setting up the room for Liberal parties. European-led liberalism had the twin effect of creating a party-wide[5] compromise (at least surrounding the costs and (vast) benefits of integration particularly within the two “governmentalized” parties) allowing parties to extensively slow and ease down ideological clashes.
Section 3 frameworks an internal moment of constitutional politics. The key post-revolution early years and the entire environment surrounding it represent a wave that was going to be “ridden” until the mid to late 1980s. Socialism, Social Democracy and Social Christian Democracy were a breath of fresh air in a country where free elections and free party organization had been suffocated by decades of dictatorship. Nonetheless, this group was an elite-driven multi-chromatic one. Their common origins meant that they proceeded with party politics complying with a widespread statist and socialist atmosphere in the public opinion in general and in the middle classes in particular. Parties were happy to ensure the necessary “make-ups” and maintain a favourable status quo which inhibited party-Liberalism and was only slowly (but significantly) challenged by outside global and European liberal calls. In the end, as the enduring and progressive European liberal “winds” arrived, parties (particularly on the right) digested it well, never finding it strategically or purposefully desirable to explicitly be or become a Liberal party.
Finally, section 4 will put our argument into context with what this study represents in terms of the current set-up and the nuances of the Portuguese party system. It will focus on the current data and rules of the party system highlighting continuities and some future uncertainties and conclude with an assessment of the political room (or lack of it) for the eventual arrival of a Liberal party.
Section 1
Conceptual toolbox – A case of ‘Sticky’ crossroads

Junctions are “critical” because they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories.[6]

Paul Pierson

In terms of axial intra-party agendas, liberalism in general and European party-Liberalism in particular, can be divided into two: 1 the economic axis calling for a reduced state apparatus and a dynamic market-based economy where competition and meritocracy are the supporting pillars; 2 the axis of political and socio-individual liberties containing the parties’ stances on moral values and issues such as abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, drug policies, foreign policy, etc.
These two axes are often interpreted and reinterpreted by each Liberal party and give rise to different denomination (such as social liberalism and classical liberalism) be it for strategic or particular realities of the context in which parties are acting. These areas constitute the space of philosophical liberalism, it is important to be aware of this dimension and that, as Kirchner observes, there is no “clear definition as to what liberal ideology consists of”[7]. We aim, however, in this piece to understand the lack of proneness in the specific Portuguese case of “party Liberalism”, Liberalism with a capital “L” will therefore lead our argument, broadly defined as the conscientious and proactive manifestation of different strands of liberalism, within Kirchner’s[8] criteria of what should be considered a Liberal party: 1 if parties call themselves liberal in their manifestos and propaganda and they present and invoke liberalism in their manifestos and propaganda / if they present and invoke liberal ideas and liberalism and principles as key elements in their conception of their political roles; 2 leading political commentators, journalists and national specialists would classify the parties in question as “liberal”; 3 the parties are members of cross-national organisations or groups which regard themselves as liberal and which can carry a “liberal” label without serious dispute; 4 after establishing significant elements of a basic liberty identity, the parties are clearly not members of any other ideological famille spirituelle.
These last sets of criteria try to tackle the problem of broadness encountered by Bale and Szczerbiak in Western European party politics “where there is centre-right and then there is centre-right”[9]. The guiding question of their piece: “why does the latter (centre right) take a particular form in one country as opposed to others, and why are some forms more successful than others?” is very similar to what we try and tackle here.
Also crosscutting this piece, Pierson and Dahrendorf’s work on the key role of timing in politics is critical in our argument. Their complementary arguments illustrate what Dahrendorf[10] defines as periods of “constitutional politics”, times that set the rules of the game and the institutional and political structures defining the social order. These moments contrast with moments of “normal politics” where choices by the electorate are made already under a pre-set political framework. The differentiation between these moments is crucial for our argument since a more careful and closer analysis of two groups of moments of constitutional politics (one internal – the 74/76 period; and one external – the fall of the Berlin Wall/European integration) will help us understand the terms in which Portuguese political rules were decided, the contingencies parties faced, what parties helped to shape but also what, in the end, they were inevitably subject to. Pierson[11] explains that patterns of stability of political mobilization are determined by the inherent tendency of collective action to be change-resistant. This occurs for two reasons: 1. those who design institutions and policies may wish to bind their successors; 2. in many cases political actors are compelled to bind themselves. His notion of “institutional stickiness” underpins our argument. These are moments that define processes of formal and informal institutional “ ‘veto points’ and ‘path dependent’ processes which in many cases tend to lock existing policy arrangements into place” and where any reform agendas are pushed in the direction of incremental adjustments to pre-existing structures. This conceptual framework is also helpful for our analysis, explaining to us just how important the “when and how” are. Sometimes “early parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens ‘too late’ may have no effect, although it might have been of greater consequence if the timing had been different”[12]
Section 2
European Liberal parties – “in uno plures” - the profile of a family and its strategies

When we look at the map of Europe we will see that there are countries where the liberal parties have performed very well (…) and then we see countries where the Liberals are eradicated or on the way out. But are the conditions for Liberal parties really that different?[13]

Ellen Trane NØrby

Our objective in this section is twofold: describe and put forward the common ground between the parties that are represented in the ELDR so we can later explain why Portuguese parties struggled to accommodate corresponding positions and to present and explain our continental junction of “constitutional politics” – European integration and the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Liberal parties were some of the first to come about, originating in the political conflicts of the 19th century. In the pre-war period they were considerably successful but the impact of both World Wars considerably rolled back their influence. They survived into the post-war period at the time when the Liberal International came into existence in 1947. Party Liberalism however had to wait until 1976 to see nine Liberal and democratic parties of the European Union coming together and forming the ELDR. Their entry as a viable force in the European parliament was immediate (winning 14% of the vote in the first elections[14]). Currently, there are 40 parties, frequently performing “pivotal or crucial roles in coalition formation”[15] with members from almost the whole of Europe. Despite being a “heterogeneous collection”[16] Liberal parties in Europe do have their stereotype. Liberal parties are generally underpinned by a culture of limited state and even anti-statism. Also, they are usually regarded as having “low organisational potential”[17] and no particular affection for a specific “well-boxed” social or interest group. They have always thrived on the middle class swing voters and drew from this audience their strengths and weaknesses. This feature contrasts with most other party families that usually rely on a core, well defined clientele (trade union, catholic, big business, etc) from which they can then launch and orient campaigns. This situation was in place up until the late 1980’s and 1990’s in Western Europe which then came across a progressive move towards a cartelization of parties and the arrival of the so-called “liberal consensus” or what Popper and Dahrendorf saw as the new European open society[18]. Compared to other parties, they have been said to yield a disproportional influence in office in relation to the number of voters tapped in the ballots. They have frequently been the “kings” of “king-makers” in several European countries (Germany, Norway, etc) and are coalition “animals” by nature with “greater eligibility than parties firmly located on the right or left”[19]. Their strength therefore relies on their flexibility and on well-seized opportunities by their governmentalized peers. Despite the obvious risks and (as small coalition partners) dependencies, German Free Democratic Party (FDP) incumbents for example, after being in coalition governments rarely miss out opportunities to claim “credit for governmental success in the media”[20] earning, more frequently than any other kind of party, popularity and support (or infamy and scorn) from the inside. Kirchner’s compilation and study in the late 1980’s led him to see the ultimate question for Liberal parties in Europe the reason why liberal parties are attracting “fickle voters”[21]. He then named three main reasons for this occurrence: 1. reliance on swinging voters at the centre of the spectrum; 2. government incumbency; 3. ambivalence of policy programmes.
Our first group of constitutional politics (European integration and the fall of the Berlin Wall) witnesses a chronological intersection of two very important trends at the level of Western European Parties – cartelization and ideological centralization. The so-called “golden age” of political parties, where the cadre and the mass party were prominent (Liberal parties falling under the label of the former), when campaigns were cheap and parties (except for the liberals) had their manifestos and election strategies neatly “boxed” and defined (meaning that “parties had their cake and ate it”) came to an end. In its place, a convergence of parties towards the centre of the political vector has occurred and the middle classes have cemented and widened their influence. The fall of the Berlin wall and the victory of liberal-democratic entendres led some authors such as Kitshelt to claim that a form of “end of history”[22] in Western Europe occurred where party mechanics now revolved around “the maturing welfare states that have organized the class compromise and the disappearance of a radical socialist alternative to capitalism both in the perception of political elites and of mass audience”. In sum, cadre and mass parties have given way to “catch-all” and to the “cartel party”. These two notions are not always compatible but do point to two distinct trends occurring since the late 1980’s: 1) the constant tactical repositioning of party stances and strategies aimed at pleasing the centre strata of the electorate, making no class or clear distinction of their group target and by doing so being able to better capture this great majority lying at the centre of the spectrum; 2) the move towards a centralization of the party machine around its headquarters, and what Panebianco[23] witnessed as “professionalisation” of the party staff has resulted in an increase in their absolute organizational strength. Cartelized parties keep moving further and further away from flat structures of decision-making and closer to fast-track, quick-reaction “business like” strategic decisions which are able to cope well against other competitors. These two trends were felt heavily across the whole of the political spectrum, except for the case of Liberal parties, which already for a long time could not rely on steady electorate.
Liberal parties were, in a way, strategically ahead of their time for bear necessity and suddenly had to come to terms with a “flood” of other players that were now in the same situation. The two self-reinforcing fluxes of European integration and the fall of the Berlin Wall hold the key to understanding how Liberal parties went through some sort of disorientation period when they “looked up” and realised all the others were, to some extent, now adopting their ways of doing politics. All parties have been squeezed by the new “big centre” but none of them as much as Liberal parties were. As Gordon Smith[24] observed, “West European democracies owe more to the liberal tradition than to any other”, but with the main goals of the old historical Liberal parties realised (democracy and secularism) the two tenets of party-liberalism (economic freedom and individual liberties) had been exorcised across the political spectrum and Liberal parties were sometimes caught adrift in a dilemma of either “shouting out” redundancies or stepping out of their framework. There was a need for reinvention.
ELDR seats (currently 62) are, as observed by Guy Verhofstadt[25], “very unevenly divided across Europe, mainly represented in the northern Germanic or Anglo-Saxon part of Europe” while in Latin southern Europe “the coverage is much less pronounced”. “This liberal paradox can be explained in part by the successes of the liberal body of thought, which has also affected non-liberal parties”. Free market and political democracy are not the divisive issues they used to be and there has been, to a certain extent, a move from confrontational politics to consensual politics or in other words a partial demise of the left/right politics of ideology. Between 1986 and 1996 the Portuguese Social Democrat Party (PSD) was part of the ELDR, until it decided to join the European Christian Democrat party family. It is somewhat ironic and meaningful that the Liberal Party family altered its denomination “European Liberal Democrats” to the, “clumsier”[26] in the eyes of Michael Steed, denomination of “Federation of European Liberal Democrat and Reform parties” (ELDR) requested by the new affiliation of PSD so that more ideological “room” within the association could be provided. The renaming was the “make-up” used to hold a party of social democrat denomination in the ranks[27] however, despite its denomination PSD actually held center-right conservative features which later on led them to drop the ELDR and join the European People’s Party (EPP). When the former president of the Liberal and Radical Youth Movement of the European Community (LYMEC), Ellen Norby argues that the answer to the question: “Are the conditions for Liberal parties in different European countries really that different?” is “that some Liberal parties have broken out of the stereotype, they need to streamline and broaden their liberal message”[28] she is only partially correct. Parties are not just an independent variable and conditions for Liberal parties throughout Europe are distinct. The chronological framework and the politico-ideological synergy between parties and their national environments at crucial “constitutional politics” moments for both national arenas and European party politics will also determine the likeliness of party presences, denominations and affiliations. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the progressive appropriation of other party families (but not the Liberal parties) of liberal values, a party such as PSD could now more easily drop the Liberal family for the Popular Party family without changing its modus operandi too much. As Ellen Norby sees it, “It is not a secret that since the end of the Cold War the values and ideas of Liberals have been taken over by socialist, conservatives and other parties that no longer had a framework. It is a great victory that our values have flourished”[29]. This victory is however, structurally and strategically somewhat of a “poisoned chalice” since it can leave European-wide Liberal Parties drifting and disoriented by the loss of the monopoly over an ideological agenda. In the end, the “function exercised by liberal parties in the post-war period was assumed in Portugal by the Social Democrat party and the Socialist party”[30] meaning that PSD and PS were able to administer in the 70s and 80s the necessary liberal reforms of the post-war period without themselves becoming explicitly Liberal parties. This argument is supported by Lobo’s recognition that the two main parties, in what was now a majoritarian rotativist model, “decided not to politicize European integration”[31], adopting instead a joint consensual movement consisting of the practice of “policies of the little steps”[32].





Section 3
Accounting for liberalism in Portugal

One day, in a visit to the old public library, I came across the first edition of “The open society and its enemies”. The copy, despite having always been in a rather accessible place, was covered by decades of dust.[33]

Jose Adelino Maltez

It is perhaps a good idea to start with a broad historical analysis of liberalism and anti-liberalism in Portugal. Despite the chronological distance of the event, the presence of a strong and ruthless inquisition left its mark, this period together with 48 years of dictatorship were, state-wise, unquestionably the most anti-liberal periods in the country. The latter is particularly important since it happened in the 20th century, enduring for almost half of it and is, up until today, still reflected in the nature of Portuguese politics and the journey of its liberalism. This link is not simply felt as a direct effect of the “Estado Novo” but also in all the subsequent reactions and ideological regroupings of parties. This was the moment when the “dices were rolled”, parties were not just formed from the revolution but they were formed within and to proceed with the revolution – a leftist revolution. This brought about some anti-liberal nuances, for example, the pre-1974 economic groups were understandably “not born from the logic of competition and market economy, but instead of statist protectionism, of the gentleman’s agreements stroke between actors in the industry and commerce with political chieftains”[34]. Nevertheless, there is, since 1820 a rooted liberal “tradition which does not capture the state but is indeed at play in Portuguese civil society”[35]. The 1822 and 1826 constitutional letters did, particularly on some juridical aspects of individual liberties and property, leave an imprint on the political game despite its substitution in 1911 (with the constitution after implantation of the Republic in 1910). The liberal constitutional monarchy failed to meet the crisis brought about by the economic and financial difficulties of an international relations environment characterized by mercantilism and protectionist policies together with the severe political crisis of the “pink map” and the British ultimatum but 19th century party liberalism had undoubtedly left its mark. One of the reasons seen by Steed and Humphreys for why parties don’t call themselves Liberal is because of the “eclipse of the distinctly compromised (by being monarchical and conservative) brand of Portuguese Liberalism by a clear Republican tradition”[36]. This view, although logical and important is not sufficient to explain the complete break with a long liberal tradition that existed both in times of constitutional democracy and Republicanism. Since the second half of the 19th century a period of “clientelist and oligarchic liberalism”[37] slowly started to emerge.
Portuguese political history can to some extent be resumed to a succession of top-down revolutions from the inside. The most famous of which, the 1974 carnation revolution, had its protagonists anxiously reacting against the right wing centralized state. The “thunder” democratization process was widely successful but maintained the centralized state machine while swinging the ideological position of the Portuguese political environment. The parties had as a result their positions in the political vector adjusted towards the left. It is important to look at the bedrock support for the socialist predisposition of the first few post-revolution years, and understand better who supports who, how, who wins and who loses. In effect, even the competitors on the right were strategically forced to adopt part of the agenda from the left if they wished to find substantial “space” as agents in the 1974 initial set-up of the political architecture, a course of action that was in turn spearheaded by the Council of Revolution (CR)[38]. The CR led the decisive set up of the party system and contributed to a considerable reduction of the political space at the centre for party-liberalism. This period was marked by intense turbulence and ideological aggression whilst the framework of core rules around which Portuguese political life would operate was under construction and the CR held, in this context, considerable power since it was a non-elected body that “could veto government bills if these did not serve the revolutionary ideals”[39]. To some extent, a reverse situation of the Italian case occurred, Geoffrey Pridham observed that the Italian centre had been “located on the right of the divide and that there had been a case of imperfect bipartism or as Sartori had put it a multipolar polarised system”[40]. The “statist fabrication”[41] of a multipolar polarised system was also clear in Portugal but in this case the deviation had been towards the left. The emergence of Portuguese political parties in 1974 was inspired by the German contemporaries of the time[42], there was in the end a predisposition of the party forces that led the German Liberal Party to finance and support PSD. There ended up being a liberal party backing up a social democrat one simply because PSD was economically closer to FDP, PSD’s ride on the neo-liberal wave of the late 80’s allowed them for formal characterization as a liberal party at the European level while retaining de facto social-democrat and conservative roots. The centralized nature of the Portuguese state and the maintenance of this reality by the main parties meant that not only parties strove to cover a wide ideological position at the centre but also that this ideological centre as state-dependent tended to be sustained on a traditionalist statist platform – something that was not a precept of party-liberalism. Another key aspect in Portuguese society is that there is an awkward rift between civil society and the state. An ambiguity between a population that is in one way or another dependent on the state (which witnessed an increase in the number of pensioners “from less than 1 per cent of the population to almost 24 per cent over 30 years”[43]) and the chronic aversion, distance and mistrust populating the imagination of public opinion. There exists a strange schizophrenia of citizens being distant and averse to the state whilst being comprehensively state dependent. The product of the workings of the CR had as a consequence, according to Sequeira[44], a market of ideas underpinned by a culture of statism - with culture, media, and education traditionally state-owned and left-wing. This adds up to paint a portrait of the character of the Portuguese middle classes, with a big percentage of the population being in one way or another dependent on state finance and making it harder for a Liberal party to go for a campaign based on a minimum state agenda.
From another angle, there is a substantial conservative Roman Catholic population (93%[45]) seeing its pinnacle in the Christian Democrats (CDS) but that also has had historical influence on all parties (except perhaps in the case of the Communist Party). This also made it more difficult for a church-distant liberal party to arise on the right. This was evident for example when Lucas Pires in the 1980’s, supported by some” young liberal civil servants and academics”[46], attempted to apply the Reaganite and Thatcherite models to a Portuguese party (CDS). Despite the important debate and discussion he generated, you ended up having a situation whereby a Christian Democrat Party was extensively attacked by the main figures of the clergy for their liberal pretensions who even stated: “don’t vote for them, they are liberal!”[47] This example is illustrative of what Pierson describes as a bad timing event. After coming into power in a congress in 1983, Lucas Pires, as an actor and an agenda, arrived in a moment when the paths of the party’s internal and external environment were not sensible enough for such a “deviant” change. Not yet ready to reward the “first politician, leader of a party, who openly classified himself as from the right”[48] with votes. Because a post-1974 anti-clerical cleavage was never really brought up to the political arena, all parties pretty much took for granted a secularization of the Republican model and the Christian right (CDS) besides being a small party, was somewhat of an unpredictable card, the PSD was pretty much left with the political spectrum on the “right” for itself, to collect the benefits of a closer agenda to PP when needed or making more salient its centrist posture of social democracy if so necessary. Around the same timeframe of Lucas Pires the Portuguese Green party came about (1982), its stereotype of “being green on the outside and red on the inside”[49] illustrates how intimate they have been for a long time with the Communist party and how they also did not step outside the ideological “sticky path”. Also in the 80s the Democratic Renovator Party (PRD), a “one man show” party created to accommodate the personality of Ramalho Eanes[50] in the political spectrum, positioned itself in the “middle of the park” but its instantaneous rise and fall flagged the moment of consolidation of the two main parties and the beginning of a rotativist bipartism that was to continue up until today. In 1987 there was then a clear turn from consensualism to majoritarianism and maintenance of a chronic “organizational weakness of parties that were never rooted to Portuguese society”[51]. None of the Portuguese parties had “affection” for any “well-boxed” social group; therefore this could never be a unique feature of an eventual liberal group - everyone was playing their strategic game. It was not until much later that the omitted libertarian space, which had not been previously filled, was seized by a political party. Since 1999 these aspects have been explored with certain success by the (reviewed Trotskyite) Left Block (BE), particularly among the younger voters, while remaining extremely far from an economic liberal programme. Libertarianism as an agenda and in terms of individual liberties is now slowly being strategically and only partially adopted by PS.
As Steed rightly observes, “where a historical party did not emerge, typically liberal issues will be handled within other parties, causing confusion to comparative political scientists”[52], this explains why from 1985 to 1995 PSD is sometimes considered a conservative-liberal party. If one is to understand PSD as Liberal, its positioning would still lie right on the edge of liberal-conservatism (strongly tending to a sudden conservatism). As we will see, our take is that, according to Kirschner’s criteria, PSD was never a Liberal party. The academic economic policy liberalism of PSD was a product of big sweeping changes occurring in the exterior that were then applied from the top-down. Cavaco Silva, an economics doctorate student from York University, revolutionized the internal proceedings and pillars of PSD, at last cutting off the socialist remainders of post-revolution PSD whose disorientation and internal dissent had made a party supposedly on the right to even call for “the establishment of a socialist society in conditions of freedom, and by exclusively democratic means”[53]. This initial intimacy with the left still leaves its imprint up until today, with PSD being one of the few conservative European parties with an involvement with trade unions – (UGT – co-chaired with PS and a counterpoint to the communist inspired CGTP).
Bruneau and Macleoud saw PSD’s defining characteristic as “personalities and the conflicts among them”[54], this propensity to swing between left and right allows us to also understand why PSD is not a Liberal Party per se. The most successful of those personalities, Cavaco Silva, came about during a turn in Portuguese politics with ongoing Portuguese integration in the European Community. Cavaco led a package of IMF and European induced “liberal” measures wishing to “liberalize” without ever referring to PSD as a Liberal party and then requesting the “young” and flexible European Liberal Democrats to broaden their denominational field of operation to the left (by putting “reform” on its denomination). Liberalism at play in PS and PSD is not simply dead but it just has not always been explicitly represented as a dominant structural element in them. After “flirting” with the socialist international and the European socialists and given such an abrupt internal shake-up by Cavaco Silva, the next one on the line (towards the right), were the European liberals, a sudden leap to the opposite side of the fence (to Conservatives or Christian democrats) would have seemed, at the time, too sweeping so the Liberals were the obvious choice for European affiliation. A more positive economic environment brought a rise in the middle classes and spurred PSD progressively towards the right to also fight more and more for CDS’s electorate. PSD is in the end a party that “clearly resembles the Italian and the Benelux Christian Democrats”[55] and does not match Kirschner’s criteria. From the start it has never been overtly referred to as Liberal neither by its militants nor by internal expert opinion, itself is not called liberal in manifestos or propaganda, commentators and journalists classified it as neo-liberal in some stages between 1985 and 1996 but is widely regarded as a conservative social democratic party. References to it as Liberal happened after its adherence to the ELDR and all of them were unsure claims that proved right to be unsure, the party was always a schizophrenic member of the Liberal international and of the ELDR in an affair that culminated in its 1996 exit and a new preference for the famille spirituelle of the European People’s Party. In the end, as Lobo remarked, both PRD and PSD were constantly criticized by the “inconsistent ideological affiliations they had negotiated”[56].
The successful cartelization and centralization of the Portuguese party system, seizing the liberal self-reinforcing fluxes of European integration and a post-Cold War Europe made sure there would not be a need for explicit party Liberalism in times to come. This last description of our moment of “constitutional politics” number 2 represented, on the whole, what Pierson sees as a process of “institutional stickiness”[57].
Section 4
Prospective discussion about the space for change, party entry and liberal revival – a glance of possible futures


I think that we would stop having absolute majorities or at least not have them as frequently. MLS would be at the centre of the political spectrum[58]

Miguel Duarte

In this section we strive to put our argument into context by evaluating the potential for change, in the specific case of Portuguese Party politics. By doing so we will hopefully understand better what the possible “triggers” are. Unlike Tim Bale’s and Aleks Szcerbiak’s work on the absence of a Christian Democrat party in Poland[59], when considering the previous political setting and the societal strata, the absence of a Liberal party in Portugal does not come as such a big surprise. The main proposition of this paper was the double movement of two groups of forces: non-liberal historical proneness of Portuguese political parties; and the posterior European-led liberal consensus “anaesthetics” (European integration and fall of the Berlin Wall), were equally injected into the majority of office-seeker Portuguese parties. As a result of this, party Liberalism was never really party-Liberalism but instead it was the liberalism of occasional party characters. One cannot even argue that there were liberal wings within certain parties at certain times [60] (with the exception perhaps of Lucas Pires and the Group of Ofir). These individuals did proceed with advancing a liberal agenda within their party structures and can be successful in doing so in some points thanks to conditions of advancing liberal agendas of a Europe that is more and more component of a politico-economical reality of a competitive world in which liberalism (though not necessarily party-Liberalism) frequently appears to be an indispensable answer. Those personalities appear on all sides of the political spectrum from PS towards the right.
The structural dilemmas for aspiring parties is a factual barrier, the presence of substantial member quotas (need for at least 5000 members) for eligibility, together with a system of party financing that favours the parties already in power, significantly decreases overture for new entries. Also the adopted Hondt formula is renowned from the collection of different electoral modalities for “favouring the parties of greater dimension”[61]. In addition, as Magalhaes also noted, the effective threshold[62] is since 1975, 6.5%, a rather high value in comparison to Proportional Representation countries such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Israel, the Netherlands and even countries such as Germany and New Zealand. This value shows evidence of the existence of some difficulties for smaller and aspiring parties. The movements of cartelization and centralization already put forward have been accompanied by a tendency towards a progressive adoption of a closed list method in the selection of party leaders, “increasing the control of individual candidates”[63]. Adding to this, the nature of Portuguese Constitution which is understandably widely influenced by the Revolutionary years has meant that it inherently holds numerous socialist references and premises. Authors, such as Luciano Amaral, claim that “you can have liberalizing measures and respect the constitution but you cannot have a liberalizing programme and respect the Constitution”[64] and that “the constitution is a constitution programmatically on the left”. In fact, if we look at the Constitution[65], one can spot some clear influences of the socialist revolution: right at the start in its preamble your read that it is one of the aims to “ensure the primacy of a democratic state based on the rule of law and open up a path towards a socialist society” or for example in article 64 it states that the national health service “shall tend to be free of charge” and article 93 aiming to “achieve effective equality between those who work in agriculture and other workers”. One can argue therefore that in juridical terms the system is also uncomfortable with explicit party liberalism.
As we saw in the previous sections “there are brief moments in which opportunities for major institutional reform appear, followed by long stretches of institutional stability.”[66] An inviting moment for institutional reform can eventually occur if the collection of centrist “pensioners party-models” [67] enters a crisis and an alternative is deemed necessary for the centre right. According to the futures trailed by the EU, the effects of continuing European liberalizing winds or crisis will ask for consequential reactions on the party’s basis. An unsatisfactory reaction could catch some parties by surprise and their inflexibility, a possible fruit of some structural rigidity, might open room for new party actors. This is however not the present case, governmental parties in general and centre-right parties in particular have been able to “juggle” public opinion and soft-core liberal reforms whilst maintaining a statist and conservative structure and set of core values. As Maltez observed in the interview “the two main parties in Portugal have many downs but do have one virtue which is being very good federators”[68].
From the interviews carried out for this dissertation the feelings were mixed and the prospects distinct. There is a consensus that life is not easy for aspiring parties however some room for change is considered but it is possible and likely that “the democratization of education after the 1970s and the appetence for democracy will produce new elites that will challenge the old one.[69] Social movements such as Liberal Social Movement (MLS), organizations such as Liberal Cause and liberals working inside Socialist and Social Democrat party frameworks face a hostile but not stagnant environment. As Maltez noted, “these new groups are seeds, curious seeds on that domain” “In an environment dominated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Ignacio Ramognet, etc. at least you start having some form of counterpoint to an intellectual domain of a revolutionary left”. There are some entry points for a party that would work as king-maker party of consensual politics in the centre, perhaps reducing the current adversarial bipolarization of the two main parties, and maintaining (like the German FDP) “a niche for itself as a corrective or balancing political force”[70]. An eventual party with a small number of members similar to the Belgium Liberal Party/Party for Freedom and Progress (PVV/PLP) would help devise a strategy able to “prevent internal factionalism by fostering tendencies around individuals rather than different policy priorities”[71]. A strong charismatic character or a wide-basis of supporters and members are crucial if a new liberal party would wish to keep away from some stereotypes such as the one the Swedish Liberal party was subject to – frequently ridiculed as “an unholy alliance of atheist social science professors from Stockholm and pietistic smallholders from the hinterland”[72]. A possibility would therefore be to rely on a strong media-friendly charismatic person that would make room and pragmatically crack into the middle, centre right or centre left of the party system. Another possibility is long-term intra-party change - the arrival of a liberal wing in one of the main parties that would become prominent due to specific evolutions in the external environment pressing parties to adopt liberal measures. As we saw this has, to a certain extent, already occurred and even when these measures are deemed indispensable it does not necessarily mean that the party would transform itself into an explicit Liberal party. Nonetheless, the vision of a three party system with a “king-maker” Liberal party at the centre could be beneficial for a system already saturated of two-party rotativism. This situation, with its positional advantages and risks, would be ideal for an eventual new actor since “the capacity of a liberal party is greatest in a three-party system.”[73] In practice, the domination of the party system by the “big two” is palpable with an increase of the concentration of votes on PS and PSD since 1975 of 11% (from 69% to 80%)[74]. In the 2005 elections a small inversion of the tendency towards bipartism was observed but only time will tell if these elections represented an exception that confirms the rule or if they were a first step towards substantial reforms and changes in the electoral and party system.

Conclusion

Looking at the last 30 years, there isn’t a tendency that affirms itself very clearly, neither as an autonomous party nor as “inside trends” within the parties[75]
Luciano Amaral

If one had to pick a key period determining the workings of Portuguese politics for the last thirty years it would undoubtedly have to be the two year period between 1974 and 1976. We understood that the opportunities and allurements of becoming a fully fledged Liberal party withered away for internal reasons, tracing back to 1974, and the formation of the contemporary party championship. This period of “thunder” politics had a leftist and socialist imprint in their formation which inhibited liberalism in general and party-Liberalism in particular for the short/medium term. The formation of Portuguese parties occurred in an unreceptive environment for party-Liberalism and parties at their inception adapted and replicated statist, Socialist, Conservative and Christian Democrat tendencies but not Liberal ones. The subsequent cartelization and centralization of the Portuguese parties kept libertarianism and party-Liberalism away from the agenda for the next decades after the revolution.
These rampant constrains to liberalism contrasted with the slow-paced and evolutionary influence of the self-reinforcing forces of the Fall of European integration and the fall of the Berlin Wall which camouflaged fully-fledged, “packaged” party Liberalism and substituted it with externally led, and often consensual, “liberalism of the small steps” and of the occasional individuality. This piece has tried to provide a sustained account for our argument that the two groups of “constitutional politics” led to ideological “shake-ups” that had as a “sticky product” thirty years of diluted party Liberalism. 1974 and the following years of political turbulence constituted a crucial historical crossroad shaping the ideological terms in which politics was to be exercised for the short and medium-term. It is not as if liberals failed but that actually they were firstly dormant and then diluted and exorcised, initially by a rhetorical reaction to the anti-democratic years of dictatorial “Estado Novo” and afterwards by slow changes and readjustments (to the internal and outside environment) in their modus operandi, coinciding with the “maturation” of the party-system and the transformation of the main parties into cartel and catch-all parties.
In 2001 Lipset and Marks concluded that the absence of a Socialist party meant that “the legacy of this absence still shaped United States politics up until the present.[76] It would not be an overstatement to say that the legacy of the absence we have explored has been an important covert actor in the narrative of Portuguese politics.
Bibliography

Bale, T. and Szczerbiak, A. (2005) Why is there no Christian democracy in Poland? (Working paper presented to the University Politics Research in Progress Seminar Series, 12 October 2005)

Corijn, L. & Krings, T. (2004) Liberalism in the European Union – The Way Forward (Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag: Berlin)

Dahrendorf, R. (2005), originally published in 1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers)

Hrbek, R. (1988) Transnational Links: the ELD and Liberal Party Group in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York) Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Kirchner, E. & Broughton, D. (1988) “The FDP in the Federal Republic of Germany” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Kirchner, E. (1988) “Western Liberal parties: developments and prospects” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Kitshelt, H. (2000) “Citizens, politicians, and party cartelization: political representation and state failure in post industrial democracies” European Journal of Political Research, No.37

Lindstrom, U. & Worklund, I. (1988) “The Swedish Liberal party” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Lipset, S. & Marks, G. (2001) It didn’t happen here – Why Socialism failed in the United States (Norton & Company: London)

Lijphart, A. (1994) Electoral systems and party systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Lobo, M. (2005) “As eleicoes para o Parlamento Europeu em Portugal, 1987-1999” (Elections for the European Parliament in Portugal, 1987-1999) in Pinto, A. (2005) (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon) (translation by the author)

Lobo, M.C. (2005) Governar em Democracia (Governing in Democracy) (Imprensa de Ciencias Sociais: Lisbon) (translation by the author)

Magalhaes, P. (2005) “Eleicoes, Partidos e Instituicoes Politicas no Portugal Democratico” (Elections, Parties and Political Institutions in Democratic Portugal) in Pinto, A. (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon) (translation by the author)

Maltez, A. (2004) Tradicao e Revolucao (Tradition and Revolution) (Tribuna: Lisbon) (translation by the author)

Norby, E. in Corijn, L. & Krings, T. (2004) Liberalism in the European Union – The Way Forward (Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag: Berlin)

Panebianco, A, (1988) Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time (Princeton University Press: New Jersey)

Pierson, P. (2001) The New politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: New York)

Pinto, A. (2005) (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon) (translation by the author)

Pridham, G. (1988) “Two roads of Italian liberalism” Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Rudd, C. (1988) “The Belgian liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Smith, G. (1988) “Between left and right: the ambivalence of European liberalism” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)

Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York)
Websites

Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (2005) [6 May 2006] http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/

Dahrendorf, R. (2004) The third way: an epitaph [1st of May 2006] http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dahrendorf24

Fritsch, A. (2005) Global Catholic Statistics 1905 and Today International Bulletin of Missionary Research [1st of April 2006] http://www.earthhealing.info/catholicstats.pdf

Union Network International (2003) Crisis in Portugal’s Pensions [1st of May 2006] http://www.union-network.org/unisocialinsurance.nsf/4bef14b2005a8079c125681100365036/624a9f5edd0971fcc1256d95001ee8c0?OpenDocument

Sequeira, M. (2004) The market of ideas in Portugal [1st of May 2006] http://www.causaliberal.net/documentosMMS/marketofideas.htm

Appendix
Interview – Miguel Duarte, Leader of the MLS (Liberal Social Movement)
31-03-2006 Lisbon


What I know from my experience with the Liberal Cause is that there are many Liberals that are part of political parties but prefer to promote liberalism from the inside, relying on existing political parties rather than creating a new one from scratch. In Portugal there are quite a few Liberals but because they are already “glued”/ tied to power they don’t see any benefits in letting go of all of what they already have and create or take part of in a new party.


I would like to know a bit more about your notion of Liberalism and on what the term represents to you.

First of all I would like to say a word on what liberalism is in Portugal. Over here liberalism for most people represents the economic sphere. For me it is not only this, Liberalism represents being Liberal in all ways, both economically and in terms of individual liberties. MLS (Liberal Social Movement) defends Liberty.
Take for example the case of the “New Democracy”, yes they are liberal but they are liberal economically, at the level of individual freedoms they are conservative (same sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia, soft drugs). Now I can accept that there must be some nuances and understand that MLS for some liberals in Portugal gives a wee bit too much attention to individual liberties and I can understand that for some people this may shock a little but for me liberalism is this, Economic and Individual Rights Liberty.

Taking into account the last 30 years how have you seen Liberalism at play in the Portuguese political narrative?

I believe that ever since the 25th of April Revolution Portuguese society has been a very conservative one. A Liberal party in Portugal in part would confront this conservative society. In terms of economic liberalism we already have PS (socialist party), PSD (social democrats), PP (Christian democrats). Curiously, in my opinion the Prime-Minister Jose Socrates is a Liberal. Curiously, there is a political compass on the internet determining the location of the PM and he fits perfectly into the MLS profile, meaning that if we took into account the “tests” I put together for new members, Socrates could be a member of MLS. Looking at some measures he is taking, fighting bureaucracy, I know that perhaps at the individual level he does not have the political courage to advance very quickly, but overall he does defend individual freedom.





In a way what I seek to understand a bit better is why the centre-right and the centre-left in Portugal assumed a certain form instead of another. What do you think are the main historical reasons for the absence of a liberal party in Portugal?

After the revolution several parties were created and people framed themselves into their belief structures. Some authors say PRD (Democratic Renovation Party) was a Liberal party but I still haven’t understood how, at least from reading their manifestos, looking back from today I don’t understand to what extent we could consider it a Liberal party.
From the moment the big parties formed onwards it became very hard for new parties to come about. Either you have a group of people who are clearly liberal, who are in clear dissonance with the reigning parties and have enough power to grab the media attention and are then able to create a new party and get members or I think it will be very complicated. I am working to create a party but my dream I know it is a dream that might take many years. I will have to create a stable basis, with a solid core of people that are in fact liberal.
I have a problem though: MLS, just because it has the word “liberal” attracts all kinds of different people. Right now, after a year of having been trying to create a political party I came to the conclusion I really have to make a selection of the people, meaning, it is not enough to just give them a declaration of principles, it is not enough to give them a political programme. I now have to do prepare an interview and actually ask them: “What is your definition of liberalism? What is your position on abortion, euthanasia, in economic terms…etc.? People of the “Liberal Cause” sort frequently come and find us. These are people very much to the right, very conservative. For instance, the last interview I made it was on the internet, he was almost an anarchist and then I asked him “Well so what do you think of the European Union…? He turned out to be a very nationalistic person while we believe in an almost federalist European Union which has all to do with the principle of freedom. Of course there should be different levels of competence but we do believe in a Union with more freedom of movement for people, business, etc. Also, when I asked this interviewee about individual freedoms he turned out to be very conservative forcing me to have to tell him that it was not worth joining MLS as he would clearly “collide” against us in several issues.
This one year experience where people have come and gone and there have been some internal conflicts I came to understand that at this stage you need some degree of consonance. In terms of organizational management this year has given me great experience and taught many things. In Portugal people don’t know what Liberalism is. Leftists will immediately think we support a liberalism of insane privatization and radical capitalism, others won’t look at the economic part of liberalism and will say when we ask “You a liberal?” –: “Yeah I’m a liberal, I’m someone with a very liberal sexual behaviour and with a very open mind – I am a liberal”. So most people, (even journalists!) find it hard to understand what liberalism is, making it more complicated to create a liberal party. There is still a big communicational and educational job to be done.

Considering the reality of the Portuguese political spectrum what do you see as the main obstacles to the entrance of a Liberal party in Portugal? What about opportunities?

Well, I see people above 30 as extremely conservative. It is in the younger generation that I see potential for a liberal party in Portugal. A good part of the younger strata is indeed liberal, that is why the “Left Block” has managed to get its share of votes, I see many of the youth voting for the left block without even being leftist. They are not worried at all with the economic part taking it for granted and vote on them for their libertarian side. Myself, despite considering myself liberal I have voted on the Left block, and why? Because I am not worried about that economic part since I know we have the big parties PS PSD PP, who will be in power and will defend that side while I find it important for there to be other parties (minority of not) that will defend the libertarian side.
The opportunity is the youth. There is a big percentage of the youth I feel as being liberal without really acknowledging it that are disappointed with the current state of affairs. Another interesting fact is that the left block is starting to be integrated in the system, leaving room for a party that is a bit against the system, I believe there will be room for a party who will defend the ideas of the youth. There is this opportunity so we will have to seize it very effectively.


What do you think this absence tells us about the nature of the Portuguese party system and dynamics?

In Portugal you have a problem at the level of party financing. It is a model that favours the winners. If you look at the German model you have a quota of 5% before you get financed. In Portugal financing is based on the quantity of votes, if there was a similar system in Portugal I would have had formalized MLS as a party long ago since I would know I would have a jump start in terms of financing for the organization at an earlier, crucial stage. A recent reform has determined that in order to be considered a party you need at least 5000 members as so my problem is not the needed 7500 signatures but actually the 5000 members. Despite this there is not a minimum amount for a member but this brings obvious dilemmas = financing/membership dependence.


Do you think a Liberal Democrat party such as the ones in the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, etc. would bring something positive and innovative? Why?

Considering all the strands of Liberalism we identify ourselves with in Europe we are probably closer to the Dutch D66. I see for example the British Liberal Democrats as too much to the left and somewhat populist, perhaps because they are a “non-governmentalized” party (at least at the national level). I find them populist particularly at the economic level, their stance on tuition fees, NHS, etc.

How do you think the Portuguese party system would behave with the arrival of a Liberal party?


I think that with a bit of luck we would stop having absolute majorities, at least not as frequently since MLS would be at the Centre of the political spectrum. Strategically we might eventually decide not to do this frequently becoming a potential coalition member. I think that it would be a lot easier PS and PSD to have a coalition with MLS than for example for PS to form a coalition with PCP or the Left Block. On the left and considering the current for of PS we would undoubtedly be the best coalition option. On the right it would depend on PSD at the time but, despite everything, we could work as a balance for an eventual coalition where PSD and PP would not be enough to form government. We would push towards a more balanced, less monopolized form of government, on a right wing coalition we would push the individual liberties agenda while on the case of a left wing coalition we would also speak up for the more market centred Liberal view of affairs. We believe it would be important to balance the system and prevent absolute majorities which are in my perspective undesirable.


Interview – Jose Adelino Maltez, Professor of Political Science at the Higher Education Institute for Social Sciences and Politics in Lisbon; Member of the Political Commission of Lucas Pires’ CDS between 1983-1985; founding member of the Party of the New Democracy (having now left)
03-04-2006 Lisbon

I and Paulo Ferreira da Cunha must have been two of the first Portuguese to have gone to a Liberal International. It was two years ago in Dakar.
One thing is to take Lipset, Fukuyama, Schmiter, make an outside analysis about the Portuguese situation and run the risk of reaching precipitated conclusions. Why do we not have a Liberal Party? Because the group of the Liberal International and the European Liberal parties, born in the post-war period acted in a terrain that had nothing to do with our 20th century model, their “ready-made” proposals did not adapt to the Portuguese circumstances. It is important to avoid a possible Anglo-American reading that Portugal is incompatible with Liberalism. Take Benfica for example, and I’m not kidding, Benfica is something that does not exist anywhere else in Europe - a product of liberal activism in the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. Something unprecedented and quite interesting of that age was activism and elections for several associations in civil society. These traditions, in one way or another, persist up until today. There is since 1834 a rooted liberal tradition which does not capture the state but does capture Portuguese civil society. There is a rooted liberalism in civil society because Salazarist authoritarianism/dictatorship did not penetrate into civil society, Salazarism never meddled into Benfica’s elections (there were always communists in the board of Benfica during Salazarism), Salazarism did not meddle into trade union activism (until the 39-45 war), it was a form of authoritarianism in the state that did not interfere with civil society. This civil society is composed of elements attentive to egalitarianism and of strong activism living detached from the state. One thing is the analysis of the state and another is the analysis of Civil Society, in terms of Civil Society we can say that Portugal is a triumph of the demo-liberal models of the 19th century, meaning that its society of the “ancient regime” deeply changed as was seen in “Pupilas do senhor Reitor”, romances of Julio Dinis, etc. A curious anecdote is the story behind the first name of the English Liberal Party. They were first called “Liberales” because of the two liberal revolutions in Europe (Spain in 1812 and Portugal 1820). So this first name is not English but actually Castellan. In the context of the 19th century Liberal movements there are successful liberal movements in Portugal and Spain, something that did not happen for example in Germany, Italy (until 1861).
Portugal is, with its 1974 transition from an authoritarian to a democratic situation, an atypical case where when the parties are formed, none of the parties existing before the dictatorship were recovered. Spain still has PSOE, even in Russia that was the case with the parties existing before the Bolshevik revolution. In Portugal that did not happen because our parties were all of “statist fabrication” and (all curiously from the German model). The parties were implemented in a pre-revolutionary epoch. The only parties that exist are the ones that will have a place in government as their inception was from the government towards civil society. Their denominations are somewhat hypocritical, the right is social democrat, the left is socialist democrat member of the social democrat international. These two parties (PS and PSD) which have been controlling power in Portugal are Parties formed in a specific era of great ideological aggression where the party programs are on the left of the leaders, the leaders on the left of the party-members and the party-members. This kind of hypocrisy turned us into the most social-democrat country in Europe. Parties were created from the state to society. The main problematic is society being weak and the state strong. This goes all the way back to Salazar - he had a party (the national union) which was the only party in Europe part of a one-party system created by a resolution of the Council of Ministers. The Christian Democrat Party of which Salazar was a militant was created in 1917 by a resolution of the Conference of the Portuguese Bishops. Even after 1974 we kept a certain control of civil society by the state, the parties are the agents of the state, a country highly centralized in its public administration, a country without regionalization, without changed to the local forms of organization, with something called districts that comes from 1834 (attempted to suppress with 1866 constitution). There is an inheritance of what Herculano in the 19th century qualified as the inheritance possessed from demo-liberalism from absolutism.
Portugal is a small state, with specific traditions, a “Scotland with success”, that is the dimension we have. We are the Catalonia which managed to separate itself from Madrid thanks to the Luso-British alliance. Readings that put us right next to other models frequently do not acknowledge our type of formation and our type of inheritance. The absolutism of Marques de Pombal was very likely to the English model in contrast with another group composed by Castela and France which were strongly centralized. We have a conformation of medieval permanence. We were the only medieval thing that lasted, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark. This has consequences in explaining why there isn’t a liberal party in Portugal since the function exercised by liberal parties in the post-war period was assumed in Portugal by the Social Democrat party and the socialist party. All the parties were Marxist, PSD was Marxist, CDS had Marxist humanism in its constitutional project. The adaptation of the Socialist party to the models of the German SPD of Bad Godesberg happens when Mario Soares leaves and Vitor Constancio comes in, and PSD only cuts with Marxism when Cavaco Silva comes to manage it. We had a point where we had the socialist party as a social democrat party and a PSD that was still Marxist. Over here no one reads the programmes and no one knows what that is, practice is one and the theory is another. For example, in terms of European integration we are the most pro-European country in but also the most pessimist one. They are in the end forms of opportunism of the Portuguese community when it comes to challenges such as the European integration. Look at decolonisation. It wasn’t like the Indian with the British or the Argelines with the French. Portugal had a different dimension, we had 10 million inhabitants and had 1 million returnees in one week, we had to make two or three extremely complicated jumps in the 20th century and did them with considerable success: overcome authoritarianism, stay away from WW2, fight a colonial war when all the other European powers had let go, making the transition to democracy without civil war and proceed with European integration. This reveals a certain flexibility of a people that for example in the 1960s had 2 million emigrants to Europe while it carried out a colonial war.


I would like to know a bit more about your notion of Liberalism and on what the term represents to you. Taking into account the last 30 years how have you seen Liberalism at play in the Portuguese political narrative?

Is there a political party in Portugal? You are before someone who is liberal one of the few who assumes his liberal position on that domain – a traditional liberal. Each country can invent its own notion of liberalism. The notion of multi-secular liberalism is a bit the notion of the revolution of 1820, the notion of Almeida Garret, of Alexandre Herculano, the notion of the liberals of the first Republic. There is a tradition of Portuguese Liberalism, very profound and with success. How do you measure liberalism? Liberalism is freedom, particularly personal freedom. The Portuguese are some of the freest in history: look at property, the Portuguese has free alluvial property since the middle ages. We are the most property-ridden people of Europe in terms of land ownership. Everyone has a wood, everyone has a little house, and this reality is represented in our notion of personal liberty which has an extension both in terms of freedom of thought and freedom of ownership. Even, when we have a revolution the first thing we try and scrap is for individual benefit, the 25th of April revolution had a huge success because of the nationalization of banking and insurance allowing for the purchase of housing with financed interest. Every Portuguese is an owner, it is the regime with most private houses within cities, and there is no such thing as a viable letting market. All the Portuguese temptations are in terms of property, in terms of becoming an independent and free man.
This is not comparable to, for example, Eastern European countries which had forms of servitude until the end of the 19th century, we have a land ownership-based place of free men that when things are not going so well they move. (o Brazil and Europe, etc.). They moved looking for the things that mark any liberal regime, earn more money, work better, being awarded in work, get a house, get out and find a better place. The enemy of liberalism in Portugal is the state, the state is a foreign occupier, our relationship with the state is awful and in those terms liberals never conquered the state as it still remains foreign. The relationship with the state is of the thief-state and as the saying goes “thief that robs thief has 100 years of forgiveness”. Notions such as avoiding taxes over here are not seen as a social sin, the notion of respect for public property does not exist. This is a bad inheritance from absolutism, there is a democracy of civil society, a deep feeling of equality between people but there are the bad indexes that because the state was not educated there is a lot of “uncivicism” in regards to public goods (not lack of civic posture). Curiously enough, democracy produced some profound yet unexpected (by MFA program) changes, such as the municipalities and the autonomous regions (Madeira and Azores), these changes were successful and just show how organizationally and culturally there is a degree of cultural appetence to anti-statism. Another awful thing is public teaching which was not able to educate people, spending too many energies and money for little to be produced.


In your book you point to the absence in Portugal of a party that, not only claims that wants to liberalize us but that, actually says that it is Liberal. Considering the reality of the Portuguese political spectrum what do you see as the main obstacles hindering the entrance of a Liberal party in Portugal? Why do you think that is the case?

The Portuguese productive structure is more or less, 3500 000 actives. Just as many actives in the interior as emigrants active in the exterior, the earnings coming from abroad are still superior than the structural funding from the European Union. We then have 2600 000 pensioners. What has been Portuguese politics? Very simple! One million pensioners on Monday vote PS and on Tuesday vote PSD. Politics is about those 1 million pensioners that swing from PS to PSD. None of these swing voters want to make a reform of the welfare state, they are all hypocritical, never able to lead a reform until the end because a government that has absolute majority such as PS does right now, in two years time knows that PSD will be in power. Power still rests on the beneficiary who is going to decide how the money is going to be spent, and since he does not decide on civic terms he decides according to promises. They are not trade union parties. They are pensioners’ parties, a “pensionism” that results from a natural reaction to the 25th of April.






What do you think of projects such as the Lucas Pires’ one for CDS, the group of Ofir, movements such as the MLS and the Liberal Cause and the Party for the New Democracy?

Francisco Lucas Pires was a curious case. He appeared in 1983-1985. He was the first politician in Portugal claiming both Liberal and from the right, which was a sin! The very Church pursues liberals, which is an important point I hadn’t referred before. The Catholic Church is anti-liberal, because liberalism in Portugal was a creation of the Masonry; as so, being liberal was being Mason…up until 1974. I remember on the first campaign of Lucas Pires, on a party which was even supposed to be in name “Christian democrat”, you had bishops saying “don’t vote on that bunch because they are liberal”. What did Lucas Pires do? I happened to be a young collaborator and a member of his political commission. To put it bluntly we simply “translated” to Portuguese the successes, of that time, of Thatcher and Reagan. It was the reflex of what some saw as the liberal and conservative revolution in Europe. The movement in Portugal had its importance thanks to its actor, Lucas Pires, who was someone with great energetic capabilities, and was a protagonist who represented very well the environment at the time, letting an established left know that there were some alternatives from a different model. He arrived well in the press, attracting a lot of media attention which resulted on an effective and profound reflection in society at the time. As for the other movements: the liberal cause movement is a group of urban intellectuals who read and write some interesting things, after having discovered authors such as Hayek - they do have their penetration in a minority at an intellectual level. In an environment dominated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Ignacio Ramognet, etc. at least you start having some form of counterpoint to an intellectual domain of a revolutionary left.
The Party of the new democracy, I was one of the founders together with 3 or 4 Liberals but I can say that by now all the Liberals have left. Who stayed were Manuel Monteiro and his group who actually say they are not liberal. Some of the MLS’s members also used to be militants of the Party of the New Democracy and left. They (New democracy) use the liberal stamp but they are not, they are clearly conservative. The Liberal in this process is always dominated by Christian Conservatism; the trend of the Liberal is often to be of a left of the right to the point of voting often on the left. Why? Because the colleagues of the group, conservatives and Catholics pay special attention to moral causes and who is not catholic finds itself in trouble within this context.
Problem is that often (MLS for example) you don’t have an intellectual basis, which in turn is a particular strength of the Liberal Cause as they occupy a terrain that until five years ago was unoccupied. What was missing in Portugal was the existence, as is the case in France, of a radical Party. A Radical party, individualist, liberal and with Masonry background. The main victims of Salazar’s authoritarianism were not the communists. These, in fact, grew in dimension and became better organized killing anarcho-syndicalism. The main victims were mostly the liberals that lost their tradition and intellectual control. The rupture was terrible and there still hasn’t been a regrouping neither of the republican tradition of liberalism nor of the monarchical tradition of liberalism. There was a discontinuity, authoritarianism by jailing and prohibiting thought, controlling the university there was a rupture with this old demo-liberal tradition. So these new groups are seeds, curious seeds on that domain. Another important thing at this level is the inter-university contact; many of the members of the liberal cause are people who did master programmes elsewhere who got hold of interesting readings. But many are ex-extreme left painted as liberals, other such as Dr. Espada used to be Maoist, Leninist, etc. and then, after taking MA courses, found their “Road to Damascus”. They are rather “foreignized”, not knowing the Portuguese story or the Portuguese tradition which is one of the causes of this failure; in addition everyone’s a liberal no one listens to anyone. They also discuss a lot which is typical. Also important is the role of the patrons and corporations which keep subsidizing the socialists and ex-extreme left and communists. It doesn’t happen as in the US where liberal think tanks and studies are often sponsored. It is cheaper and easier for them to make intellectual corruption next to the extreme left since it is better to have as a protector a socialist or a social-democrat than having a liberal. Take for example big capitalists who have newspapers in Portugal, a big part of the opinion-making on those newspapers is socialist and from the left, there is no need to subsidize or give opportunities to liberal thinking.

What about opportunities for a Liberal Party?

Because the big parties are also catch-all parties there are not going to be any ideological parties, there will be federations of families of parties. The two main parties in Portugal have many downs but do have one virtue which is being very good federators, as so I don’t see the chance of there being an ideological party. The chances that there are is the federation of families and in a way that does happen, more than individual movements it is important there being the existence of liberal thought on every party, including the socialist party. There is a plurality among the families. The parties are very cunning and their centralizing mechanisms are very effective. Any attempts at penetrating the system are easily and structurally suppressed. There is a big dose of opportunism. Our regime is a democracy of success; naturally the protagonists of this process hold some privileges and reputation. The big parties have been successful because they have been able to understand the great movements of opinion are flexible and carry out several metamorphoses. (The election of leaders occurs like this, pragmatically and tactically). Between the political analyst and the simple man of the village there is a big coincidence of analysis, there is a big pragmatism in terms of what is good for the stability of democracy. This already has 30 years, we are now 10 years short of the governing time of Salazarism, it has the double of the first republic, exactly half of the constitutional democracy. So if we do the Maths between 1820 and today Portugal has more than a century of authentic freedom, with hundreds of elections. Considering this, the authoritarian memory is already a bit grey, so the analysis made of Salazarism interest extreme right and extreme left and some analysts who see us as a transition towards democracy. We are not a transition towards democracy, the regimes here never had a transition, the regimes here come down “rotten”. It wasn’t a king put in place by Franco to put democracy in place or Adolfo Soares who was a militant of the single party. We have a specific model that is our model.


In a small prospective exercise how do you imagine an overcoming/transformation of this present condition of “unidimensionality and micropowers”? How do you describe what you called “real utopia” in your last book and what would its method be?

I am a professor not a politician, every reasonable political scientist that goes into politics are usually a disaster. The analyst is different from the actor, they have distinct qualities. I jokingly usually say that in 10 years time Portugal will have something completely different. It will be the issue of European integration; the issue of non-emigration, the Portuguese economy is not that much in crisis as it is said. We are producing jobs but (97000 jobs) although we produce jobs they are jobs that the Portuguese do not want. We already are in a phase of rich country crisis (not too rich, of a 25th in PNUD ranking rich), it is the first time this happens and with a curious psychological element attached to it which is feeling of terrible pessimism. This can be a good thing. It means we realized we are going into a new phase. The democratization of education after the 1970s and the appetence for democracy will produce new elites that will challenge the old one. We are not, however, going to be sole actors. The next Portuguese crisis will be the next European crisis. We will be receptors. In a similar way that the extreme left has already change with these crisis I believe the next crisis will affect the other side of the barricade, the big right, the non-PS towards the right. There will be a change in circumstances. The kind of crisis will change from a national closed nation-state to a broader multi-dimensional regional basis. We have had the capability to suffer and go through predicaments before but will future generations be willing to pay pensions and sustain a welfare state model that is failed a growth in youth employment? So far the welfare state still hangs on like is the case in the privileged “out of time” France. Over here there is no CPE - we only got out good old temporary green receipts.

Interview – Luciano Amaral, Professor of Economic History in Lisbon’s Nova University; member of the Liberal Cause Group
05-04-2006 Lisbon

I would like to know a bit more about your notion of Liberalism and on what the term represents to you.

My perspective on Liberalism is the one closer to the so-called classic Liberals. The strand that believes that a good part of the social problems that arise can be solved through the spontaneous relation between citizens where the state mostly assumes the function of creating the framework to make the most out of this natural relation. The state will refrain from directing the actions of individuals, positive relations will then arise from correct frameworks of flexibility.
I think this is true for all spheres of life, sometimes people focus solely on the economic aspect (liberals want to combat social benefits, etc.) In fact, the liberal perspective goes beyond this. Liberalism in terms of individual freedoms is a tricky business, for example in terms of drugs, same-sex marriage - policy-making on some of these issues can be very liberal at the individual level while at the same time being very interventionist at the economic level. So one should have a broad picture - in the same way this liberty applies to our personal lives it is to be applied in the economic dimension which is a crucial part of that same life. Take the same-sex marriage example: not being pro-gay marriage does not mean being against homosexuality per se. One thing is to see homosexuality as a free individual act and accept it as such and a different thing is creating a juridical institution born out of this sexual practice. Liberalism is not allowing everything to happen, it frequently means putting forward restrictions, the thing about these restrictions is that they are relatively open, soft yet clear and precise, allowing for an intense spontaneous relation between individuals. It is also important to distinguish this, which is my perspective of liberalism, with other liberal perspectives which are anarchical, liberal libertarianism in which there are no rules, no state, any kind of limit is put aside. My version is a bit more orderly.


Taking into account the last 30 years how have you seen Liberalism at play in the Portuguese political narrative?

It is practically non-existent. There are people within the two big parties and CDS that have some liberal ideas, but so far parties haven’t really applied any idea deriving from liberalism. They may have used liberalizing measures in society, but a liberal programme was never seen. It has also a lot to do with the Portuguese constitution, more socialist than our constitution only in the old soviet countries, from the onset of this framework of rules it has been very hard to be a liberal in Portugal.
Looking at the last 30 years, there isn’t a tendency that affirms itself very clearly, neither as an autonomous party neither as inside trends within the parties. For example, not even PSD or CDS have a liberal wing/trend. There are however small groups of people that organize themselves (such as Liberal cause) which is less more than a Blog, although we have published a book and are perhaps going to diversify its action a bit more.

Considering the reality of the Portuguese political spectrum what do you see as the main obstacles to the entrance of a Liberal party in Portugal?

I don’t believe there is something exceptional about Portugal, looking at Europe. Taking for example England, Italy, Germany, etc., countries of historical liberalism, all of them saw big difficulties on the 20th century to exercise its liberalism and reintegrate liberal aspects in their political systems. In Spain the right is not liberal. Now there is an attempt by Aznar and PP’s president Mariano Rajoy to reformulate the party as a liberal party. In France there also isn’t a strong liberal party. Jacques Chirac and Villepin do not have any liberal ideas, on the contrary, these last confusions in France arising out of a small liberalization attempt shows how even the French right is structurally prevented from being liberal. The central and South European context sometimes also doesn’t help liberal waves to emerge when comparing to places such as the US, Canada, in Australia and in some Scandinavian countries .Even in some countries that are social-democrat, there is a strong liberal tradition. When the Welfare state was substituted in the 1990s, it was substituted in part by liberalism (Denmark, previous government in Norway, in Sweden a bit harder). So the Anglo Saxon World and Scandinavia are exceptions that confirm the rule. Together with this, the ex Soviet block countries because they experienced the worst of socialism, they are now in a phase in which liberalism is normal and openly discussed.

What do you think this absence tells us about the nature of the Portuguese party system and dynamics?

Over here, when you speak of liberalism people immediately think of neo-liberalism, then of savage neo-liberalism. Besides this “European problem” there is the question of the Portuguese regime, the Portuguese regime virtually prohibits liberal governments. You can’t have a liberal programme whilst respecting the Portuguese Constitution. You can have liberalizing measures and respect the constitution but you cannot have a liberalizing programme and respect the constitution. Starting in the preamble which says we are building a classless, socialist society after explaining what the MFA was and the whole story of the new regime. Afterwards the articles are different but just like it was made in 76 it was a mix of some liberties that any liberal would indeed want but with a programme to build a classless society, having part of the programme nationalizing a third of the economy (a third of the economy should never leave the public sphere- changed in 89). Another example is that healthcare should be free. Now this has changed to a clause that sees healthcare has something that should tend towards being free. In the end, in the event you may wish to review and fully restructure the healthcare system from its foundations you simply cannot because the Constitutional Court won’t allow you to. Even a party hypothetically forming government and winning the elections, in these terms, would most likely be blocked from acting from the biased juridical structure. The President of the Republic has to, first of all, respect the Constitution. This question is rather relevant since anyone who comes up with a liberal idea appears to be opposing democracy and pretending to go back to fascism. The constitution is a constitution programmatically on the left.


What opportunities do you see for a Liberal Party to arise? Do you think a Liberal Democrat party such as the ones in the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, etc. would bring something positive and innovative? Why?

I see some opportunities which in turn, it does not mean these will definitely come through. I see opportunities perhaps for a bad reason which is the crisis of the European Welfare State. What we witness in Portugal right now, taking the current government to take up what are considered some liberalizing measures (which many people on the left consider them to be rightist) has already led the left to apparently move to the right. These crisis-motored attempts have been happening throughout Europe - Germany, France, and Scandinavia. The crisis of these systems can lead to the arrival of an alternative essentially different entity which would call for a radical structural change of the political framework and rhetoric.
It is my conviction that what exists right now is not sustainable. If this is not the case it will be very hard for a liberal party to appear and why is that, because of the statist systems of redistribution of wealth. In Portugal, the earnings of half the population depend on the state: civil servants, pensioners, unemployed, and subsidized. How is it possible in such a situation to mobilize this half to change and support liberalizing measures since the state is such a font of wealth redistribution? It would have to be a crisis such as the one in the Scandinavian countries (1990s). This is a two faced coin, again, look at France, the crisis of the Welfare state can be an opportunity for reform but it can also be an opportunity for a leftist, statist, populism which says “non” to those who want to spoil the “wonderful world”.


How do you think the Portuguese party system would behave with the arrival of a Liberal party?

There is a trend for bipolarization. It should be like what the left block allowed to a certain part of PS’s agenda. The PS adopted that agenda surrounding gay marriage, abortion, etc. So a liberal party could function a bit like that a bit of an “inspiration” for PS and PSD. A nationalist party I think would be more likely to be successful if, created by someone such as Cavaco Silva but what can happen more easily is that one of the two big parties adopt a substantial part of this agenda. In the same lines of what happened with the Tory Party in Great Britain or the Republican party in the US which are not liberal per se but are a mix of the conservative religious right, the anti-statist right, etc. All these mix together and get behind a candidate. In great Britain there used to be a liberal party which was to the left of the Tories, when it finished, the Tories adopted part of its agenda. The Tories are both a conservative and a liberal party. But when you look at our parties I can’t imagine them truly doing so.


What do you think of projects such as the Lucas Pires’ one for CDS, the group of Ofir, movements such as the MLS and the Liberal Cause and the Party for the New Democracy?

Lucas Pires represented an attempt of introducing a bit of that discourse, there was certain coherence but there was perhaps a problem of timing. When he came about there was still so much to be done. At the time it was prohibited by the constitution to have private Siderurgy, there was still that compulsive third of nationalized economy. It was then easier to do the policies of the little steps (done by PS and PSD). It had some impact but not as much as it could have had. The liberal cause has modest aims, feeding some discussions around the Blog, the site, editing some books, doing some conferences here and there. We try to keep the flame of debate burning but we have not been very prolific, not much campaigning, though sometimes we appear in the newspaper or someone takes us into a bit more consideration. The problem with the Liberal Cause is that it is not a think tank, if we were a think tank, getting funding and making some profit we would have people full time and perhaps achieve another dimension and impact.
[1] Lipset, S. & Marks, G. (2001) It didn’t happen here – Why Socialism failed in the United States (Norton & Company: London)
[2] Maltez, A. (2004) Tradicao e Revolucao (Tradition and Revolution) (Tribuna: Lisboa), p.122
[3] Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time (Princeton University Press: New Jersey)
[4] Dahrendorf, R. (2005, originally published in 1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers), p.28
[5] A compromise by all except the Communist party, PP with Monteiro was also one of the first to carry out a campaign based on an anti-European platform in the 1990s leading PP to abandon the European People’s party for European Democratic Alliance. See Lobo, M. C. (2005) “As eleicoes para o Parlamento Europeu em Portugal, 1987-1999” (Elections for the European Parliament in Portugal, 1987-1999) in Pinto, A. (2005) (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon)
[6] Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time (Princeton University Press: New Jersey), p.13
[7] Kirchner, E. (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.2
[8] ibid, p.5
[9] Bale, T. and Szczerbiak, A. (2005) Why is there no Christian democracy in Poland? (Working paper presented to the University Politics Research in Progress Seminar Series, 12 October 2005)
[10] Dahrendorf, R. (2005, originally published in 1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers)
[11] Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time (Princeton University Press: New Jersey), p.43
[12] ibid, p.44
[13] Norby, E. in Corijn, L. & Krings, T. (2004) Liberalism in the European Union – The Way Forward (Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag: Berlin), p.32
[14] Corijn, L. & Krings, T. (2004) Liberalism in the European Union – The Way Forward (Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag: Berlin), p.5
[15] Kirchner, E. (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.1
[16] Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.396
[17] Kirchner, E. (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.8
[18] Dahrendorf, R. (2005, originally published in 1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers), p.28
[19] Smith, G. (1988) “Between left and right: the ambivalence of European liberalism” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.23
[20] Kirchner, E. (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.10
[21] Kirchner, E. (1988) “Western Liberal parties: developments and prospects” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.483
[22] Kitshelt, H. (2000) “Citizens, politicians, and party cartelization: political representation and state failure in post industrial democracies” European Journal of Political Research, No.37, p.161
[23] Panebianco, A, (1988) Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
[24] Smith, G. (1988) “Between left and right: the ambivalence of European liberalism” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.18
[25] Corijn, L. & Krings, T. (2004) Liberalism in the European Union – The Way Forward (Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag: Berlin), p.72
[26] Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.406
[27] PSD at the time was (proportionately) one of the most successful of the groups electing 9 members see Hrbek, R. (1988) Transnational Links: the ELD and Liberal Party Group in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.465
[28] Norby, E. in Corijn, L. & Krings, T. (2004) Liberalism in the European Union – The Way Forward (Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag: Berlin), p.32
[29] Corijn, L. & Krings, T. (2004) Liberalism in the European Union – The Way Forward (Berliner Wissenschafts-verlag: Berlin), p.32
[30] Maltez, A. (2006) Interview on the 03-04-2006 (see appendix, p.20)
[31] Lobo, M. C. (2005) “As eleicoes para o Parlamento Europeu em Portugal, 1987-1999” (Elections for the European Parliament in Portugal, 1987-1999) in Pinto, A. (2005) (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon), p.202
[32] Amaral, L. (2006) Interview on the 05-04-2006 (see appendix, p.26)
[33] Maltez, A. (2004) Tradicao e Revolucao (Tradition and Revolution) (Tribuna: Lisbon), p.700
[34] ibid, p.676
[35] Maltez, A. (2006) Interview on the 03-04-2006 (see appendix, p.19)
[36] Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.428
[37] Pinto, A. (2005) (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon), p.12
[38] Among the members of the Council of Revolution were the Movement of the Armed Forces, the President of the Republic, Top Army Commanders and the Prime Minister.
[39] Lobo, M.C. (2005) Governar em Democracia (Governing in Democracy) (Imprensa de Ciencias Sociais: Lisbon), p.56
[40] Pridham, G. and Sartori in Pridham, G (1988) “Two roads of Italian liberalism” Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.35
[41] Maltez, A. (2006) Interview on the 03-04-2006 (see appendix, p.19)
[42] See Maltez, A. (2004) Tradicao e Revolucao (Tradition and Revolution) (Tribuna: Lisbon), p.702, p. 28
[43] Union Network International (2003) Crisis in Portugal’s Pensions [ 1st of May 2006] http://www.union-network.org/unisocialinsurance.nsf/4bef14b2005a8079c125681100365036/624a9f5edd0971fcc1256d95001ee8c0?OpenDocument
[44] Sequeira, M. (2004) The market of ideas in Portugal [1st of May 2006] http://www.causaliberal.net/documentosMMS/marketofideas.htm
[45] Fritsch, A. (2005) Global Catholic Statistics 1905 and Today International Bulletin of Missionary Research[1st of April 2006] http://www.earthhealing.info/catholicstats.pdf
[46] These had been vastly influenced by an intellectual movement denominated “The group of Ofir” in Maltez, A. (2004) Tradicao e Revolucao (Tradition and Revolution) (Tribuna: Lisbon), p.702
[47] Maltez, A. (2006) Interview on the 03-04-2006 (see appendix,p.16)
[48] Maltez, A. (2004) Tradicao e Revolucao (Tradition and Revolution) (Tribuna: Lisbon), p.702
[49] ibid, p.703
[50] Ramalho Eanes was electes President of Portugal in 1976 and had been a key figure in the Post-1974 era
[51] Magalhaes, P. (2005) “Eleicoes, Partidos e Instituicoes Politicas no Portugal Democratico” (Elections, Parties and Political Institutions in Democratic Portugal) in Pinto, A. (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon), p.174
[52] Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.421
[53] Kholer in Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.428
[54] Bruneau and Macleoud in Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.428
[55] Steed, M. & Humphreys, P. (1988) “Identifying liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.431
[56] PSD was lost between ELDR, the Socialists and the European Popular Party while PRD had opted for the Gaullists, see Lobo, M. (2005) “As eleicoes para o Parlamento Europeu em Portugal, 1987-1999” (Elections for the European Parliament in Portugal, 1987-1999) in Pinto, A. (2005) (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon), p.199
[57] Pierson, P. (2001) The New politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: New York), p.414
[58] Duarte, M. (2006) Interview on the 31-03-2006 (see appendix, p.18)
[59] Bale, T. and Szczerbiak, A. (2005) Why is there no Christian democracy in Poland? (Working paper presented to the University Politics Research in Progress Seminar Series, 12 October 2005)
[60] Amaral, L. (2006) Interview on the 05-04-2006 (see appendix, p.25)
[61] Magalhaes, P. (2005) “Eleicoes, Partidos e Instituicoes Politicas no Portugal Democratico” (Elections, Parties and Political Institutions in Democratic Portugal) in Pinto, A. (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon), p.175
[62] This value represents the average between effective threshold of inclusion (minimum percentage of the vote that can earn a party a seat under the most favourable circumstances) and the effective threshold of exclusion (maximum percentage of the vote that, under the most unfavourable conditions, may be insufficient for a party to win a seat), see Lijphart, A. (1994) Electoral systems and party systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 25 and 27
[63] Magalhaes, P. (2005) “Eleicoes, Partidos e Instituicoes Politicas no Portugal Democratico” (Elections, Parties and Political Institutions in Democratic Portugal) in Pinto, A. (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon), p.177
[64] Amaral, L. (2006) Interview on the 05-04-2006 (see appendix, p.25)
[65] Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (2005) [6 May 2006] http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/
[66] Thelen in Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time (Princeton University Press: New Jersey), p.134
[67] Maltez, A. (2006) Interview on the 03-04-2006 (see appendix, p.21)
[68] ibid, p.23
[69] ibidem
[70] Kirchner, E. & Broughton, D. (1988) “The FDP in the Federal Republic of Germany” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.87
[71] Rudd, C. (1988) “The Belgian liberal parties” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.209
[72] Lindstrom, U. & Worklund, I. (1988) “The Swedish Liberal party” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.252
[73] Smith, G. (1988) “Between left and right: the ambivalence of European liberalism” in Kirchner, E. (Ed.) (1988) Liberal Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge: New York), p.18
[74] Magalhaes, P. (2005) “Eleicoes, Partidos e Instituicoes Politicas no Portugal Democratico” (Elections, Parties and Political Institutions in Democratic Portugal) in Pinto, A. (ed.) Portugal Contemporaneo (Contemporary Portugal) (Dom Quixote: Lisbon), p.181
[75] Amaral, L. (2006) Interview on the 05-04-2006 (see appendix, p.25)
[76] Lipset, S. & Marks, G. (2001) It didn’t happen here – Why Socialism failed in the United States (Norton & Company: London), p.292

1 comment:

antonio salgado nolasco said...

Las empresas multinacionales buscan el Portugal de Orden y Prosperidad (Lusitania Felix) del Profesor Cavaco Silva y del Ingeniero Señor Sócrates.